The Local Turn: an Introductory Essay Revisiting Leadership, Elite Capture and Good Governance in Indonesian Conservation and Development Programs

Abstract

The local turn in good governance theory and practice responded to critiques of the ineffectiveness of state management and the inequity of privatization alternatives in natural resource management. Confounding expectations of greater effectiveness from decentralised governance, including community-based natural resource management, however, critics argue that expanded opportunities for elite capture have become widely associated with program failures. This overview of theoretical controversies on leadership, patronage and elite capture is part of a themed section in this issue that challenges assumptions across a wide range of current policy literature. It introduces a set of Indonesian case studies that examine practices of local leaders and elites and seek to account in structural terms for appropriations both by (‘elite capture’) and of (‘captured elites’) these key figures. These studies explore the structural factors and co-governance practices most likely to promote effective participation of the full spectrum of local interests in pursuit of better local natural resource governance.

The end of shark finning? Impacts of declining catches and fin demand on coastal community livelihoods

“…The transfer of significant authorities to regency level was meant to bring decision-making and pro-poor policy commitments more directly to ordinary people at grassroots. The problem of capture of institutional authority and benefits by local elites has since become a prominent concern in both the development and conservation communities, however [42,43]. The critical role of bosses in patron-client based social security provision, as well as the more exploitative aspects of elite capture and control, must be addressed in negotiating the nested accountabilities that decentralised multi-scale governance was supposed to offer [44].…”

Asymmetric Decentralization and the Problem of Governance: The Case of Indonesia

“…In a more macro perspective, accountability has actually even been ousted by, among others, the prominence of patronage and clientelism in local election (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016). Other scholars also shared similar concerns, though they are more generally about decentralization (for example Pepinsky & Wihardja, 2011;Suprayitno & Pradiptyo, 2017;Warren & Visser, 2016).…”

Fisher and Trader Responses to Traceability Interventions in Indonesia

“…These wider set of practices include the social dynamics of power and trust that constitute the wider every-day social existence of fishers and traders. The two cases demonstrate this most clearly through the sets of practices enacted by traders that simultaneously produce and reify their role as patrons within value chains and communities (as commonly seen in other coastal communities in Indonesia, see Kusumawati, Bush, and Visser 2013;Ferrol-Schulte, Ferse, and Glaser 2014;Pauwelussen 2015;Warren and Visser 2016;Nurdin and Grydehøj 2014;Miñarro et al 2016). Traders adopt practices to coordinate the flow of information in addition to their more traditional services of providing credit and a range of social services, including healthcare and education, to maintain their centrality in the everyday life of their communities.…”