The Local Politics of Decentralized Environmental Policy in Guatemala

Abstract

This article identifies the conditions leading to successful decentralized environmental management in the developing world. It focuses on Guatemala, a country where lawmakers have devolved forest protection to 331 municipalities. This study is based on an original survey of 100 randomly chosen mayors who held office between 1996 and 2000 and a database constructed from several national censuses that include geographic, demographic, socioeconomic, and biophysical variables. It suggests that local community pressure and central government support encourage mayors to value forest protection. Survey results also indicate that mayors allocate staff to forest protection when the central government makes this a priority. Mayors also dedicate personnel to this sector when they have more education and when their municipalities boast larger amounts of forested area.

What incentivizes local forest conservation efforts? Evidence from Bolivia

“…Our results are also consistent with earlier research (Gibson and Lehoucq 2003;Andersson and Van Laerhoven 2007;Andersson et al 2014) which suggests that pressures from below can have important, desirable impacts on municipal governments' willingness to invest in conservation.…”

“…One common justification was that local and regional governments are more accountable to voters than national governments (Guerrero Figueroa 2002World Resources Institute 2005a;Ribot 2008). In the last two decade or so, however, it has become clear that most of these decentralization reforms have had mixed results (Gibson and Lehoucq 2003;Andersson and Van Laerhoven 2007). Even so, decentralization, and the promotion of conservation through democratic accountability remains an important part of many pro-conservation policies.…”

Municipal politics and forest governance: Comparative analysis of decentralization in Bolivia and Guatemala

“…Among other factors, he points to the importance of a motivated mayor for decentralization to succeed. Andersson (2003) and Gibson and Lehoucq (2003) specifically analyze the factors that influence the varying levels of local politicians' motivation to get involved in natural resource governance activities. Independently, these two studies conclude that institutional incentives-such as pressure from organized forest user groups, central government support and supervision, and timber royalties-are key factors to consider when explaining varying levels of municipal-government interest in natural resource governance.…”

“…Others indicate that decentralization operates differently depending on precisely what powers are decentralized (i.e., Cohen & Peterson, 1999;Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998;Ribot, 2002;Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1989). Still others argue that decentralization may work, but only in the context of specific institutions that include mechanisms of accountability, oversight, and resource transfers (i.e., Agrawal & Ribot, 1999;Andersson, 2003;Blair, 2000;Fiszbein, 1997;Gibson & Lehoucq, 2003;Larson, 2002). Studies using relatively large samples of municipalities to test these hypotheses are uncommon for single-country studies and nonexistent for multi-country studies.…”

“…Building on the initial one-country studies by Andersson (2003) and Gibson and Lehoucq (2003), this study takes the analysis of institutional incentives for decentralized forest governance one step further by comparing the dynamics of municipal politics in two different countries. This allows us to explore whether these conditions are country specific or operate at a more general level.…”