“…In fact, firms face different trade-offs in their delisting decision depending on the type of voluntary delisting and whether or not they will continue trading afterwards (Bessler, Kaen, & Kurmann, 2012;Chaplinsky & Ramchand, 2012).…”
Section: Literature Review Voluntary Delistingmentioning
The scope of this paper is to contribute to the question of delisting (both voluntary and involuntary), with particular emphasis on the initial conditions leading up to the Initial Public Offering (IPO) of the firms. The case of Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) is examined, specifically the IPOs of years 1996-2004 and their subsequent performance (delisting or not) till the end of 2017. We find that the probability of delisting is positively associated with the size of the issuance and the degree of earnings' manipulation and negatively associated with audit quality, information transparency, and market timing. The effects of audit quality, size of issuance, and earnings' manipulation are accentuated in instances of voluntary delisting while the effect of market timing is more clearly pronounced in instances of involuntary delisting. Our results are robust to a number of confounding factors including size, profitability, leverage, liquidity, growth options, and corporate governance. Our work is not replication of existing studies; in addition, we choose ASE as in that capital market there were many delistings the last two decades.
“…In fact, firms face different trade-offs in their delisting decision depending on the type of voluntary delisting and whether or not they will continue trading afterwards (Bessler, Kaen, & Kurmann, 2012;Chaplinsky & Ramchand, 2012).…”
Section: Literature Review Voluntary Delistingmentioning
The scope of this paper is to contribute to the question of delisting (both voluntary and involuntary), with particular emphasis on the initial conditions leading up to the Initial Public Offering (IPO) of the firms. The case of Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) is examined, specifically the IPOs of years 1996-2004 and their subsequent performance (delisting or not) till the end of 2017. We find that the probability of delisting is positively associated with the size of the issuance and the degree of earnings' manipulation and negatively associated with audit quality, information transparency, and market timing. The effects of audit quality, size of issuance, and earnings' manipulation are accentuated in instances of voluntary delisting while the effect of market timing is more clearly pronounced in instances of involuntary delisting. Our results are robust to a number of confounding factors including size, profitability, leverage, liquidity, growth options, and corporate governance. Our work is not replication of existing studies; in addition, we choose ASE as in that capital market there were many delistings the last two decades.
“…The United States has its legal origin in common law, with investor protection being among the best in the world (Berk & DeMarzo, 2006). In the same vein, Bessler, Kaen, Kurmann & Zimmermann (2012) emphasize that, in the US, the corporate and legal governance system is superior, protects minority shareholders, ensures transparency of financial reporting, and reduces managers' ability to derive private benefits.…”
Section: Conclusion and Contributions Of The Studymentioning
The present work sought to identify the influence of the control
structure on the accounting and market performance of listed and delisted
Brazilian companies traded only on B3 as compared to those with a double
listing with the US (ADRs). For this purpose, linear regressions were
applied by GMM-Sys with unbalanced panel data. It was evidenced that for
companies traded only on B3, the control structure is negatively related to
efficiency while listed and positively related when delisting occurs,
prevailing shareholder conflict. This context is inverse to that found in
the analysis of ADRs, where the control structure is positively related to
efficiency while listed and negatively related when delisting occur, proving
that, in this case, agency conflicts prevail. This study confirms that the
effects of US Commom Law also affect Brazilian companies that are traded in
the US.
“…In addition, while the cost and complexity of complying with US capital market regulations increased after the application of SOX, foreign firms' domestic markets developed and improved their governance over time, narrowing the competitive gap between the markets. Bessler et al (2012) highlight that the introduction of SOX in the USA, combined with improvement in German corporate governance laws and the emergence of alternative trading platforms, are the main reasons for German firms' delisting from the US markets. Gao et al (2013) and Doidge et al (2015) challenge the 'SOX cost hypothesis' as an explanation for the falling number of US IPOs.…”
Section: Compliance Versus Non-compliancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bessler et al . () highlight that the introduction of SOX in the USA, combined with improvement in German corporate governance laws and the emergence of alternative trading platforms, are the main reasons for German firms’ delisting from the US markets.…”
Section: Reasons For Voluntary Delistingmentioning
This paper discusses the literature on delisting, drawing on USA and international evidence. Given the great heterogeneity in delisting operations, we first consider the standard existing typology based on the initiator of the delisting (the stock market authorities, or the firm itself). Second, while managers often cite high compliance costs (especially due to Sarbanes–Oxley Act implementation) as the official reason for the voluntary delisting of their firm, we highlight that firms face different trade‐offs in their delisting decision. We also examine the reasons for involuntary delisting, especially the delisting dilemma faced by stock market authorities when the firm violates the listing requirements. Next, we review the economic consequences of delisting in terms of value creation or value destruction for shareholders. Finally, noting gaps in the literature and other contrasting results, we propose suggestions for future research.
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