The link between judgments of comparative risk and own risk: Further evidence

Abstract

Individuals typically believe that they are less likely than the average person to experience negative events, a phenomenon termed "unrealistic optimism". The direct method of assessing unrealistic optimism employs a question of the form, "Compared with the average person, what is the chance that X will occur to you?". However, it has been proposed that responses to such a question (direct-estimates) are based essentially just on estimates that X will occur to the self (self-estimates). If this is so, any factors that affect one of these estimates should also affect the other. This prediction was tested in two experiments. In each, direct- and self-estimates for an unfamiliar health threat - homocysteine-related heart problems - were recorded. It was found that both types of estimate were affected in the same way by varying the stated probability of having unsafe levels of homocysteine (Study 1, N=149) and varying the stated probability that unsafe levels of homocysteine will lead to heart problems (Study 2, N=111). The results are consistent with the proposal that direct-estimates are constructed just from self-estimates.

Cultural Differences in Unrealistic Optimism and Pessimism: The Role of Egocentrism and Direct Versus Indirect Comparison Measures

“…The selection of measurement method (indirect or direct) clearly influences cross-cultural patterns of unrealistic optimism and pessimism. Some researchers have dismissed comparative biases (e.g., unrealistic optimism) that emerge from the direct method because such measurements are flawed and driven more by cognitive processes (e.g., egocentrism) than motivational tendencies (Aucote & Gold, 2005;Covey & Davies, 2004;Gold, 2007;Hamamura et al, 2007;. It remains controversial, however, as to whether one type of judgment represents the most veridical measure of comparative bias.…”

Individuals With OCD Lack Unrealistic Optimism Bias in Threat Estimation

“…To control for differences in real-life experiences, participants also rated how often these events had happened to themselves or relatives in the past. Results demonstrated that participants reporting no OCD symptoms showed an unrealistic optimism bias (Gold, 2007;Weinstein, 1980). That is, they deemed negative events to happen less likely to themselves as compared to others, and positive events to happen more likely to themselves than others.…”

Explaining False Uniqueness: Why We are Both Better and Worse Than Others

“…Third, manipulations of event characteristics, such as to the perceived frequency, desirability, or controllability of an event, produce predictable changes in comparative optimism and pessimism (e.g., Chambers et al., 2003; Gold, 2007; Kruger & Burrus, 2004; see also Kruger, 1999; Reber, Meier, Ruch‐Monachon, & Tiberini, 2006). Although such manipulations should have no overall effect on people's comparative risk estimates because they affect the self and comparison group's chances exactly the same, they do, evidently because people give too little consideration to how the comparison group's chances are affected and too much to how their own are affected.…”