This paper uses the discussion within the Italian fiscal tradition on the supposed Ricardian equivalence between debt and taxation to give context to the Western Australian (WA) Government's growing net debt from the late phase of the 'millennium boom'. It is suggested that WA's experience, in which growth in net debt has been driven significantly by growth in general government expenses, accords best with Pareto's main reason for rejecting Ricardian equivalence. The WA Government did have a strategy to maintain structural fiscal balance over the long term, but the targets or rules associated with that strategy were abandoned and replaced by weaker rules. It is argued that, if those rules were more 'constitutional' in character, then the WA Government's net debt would not have blown out in the manner that it did.Regional Australia faces many and diverse challenges and opportunities. Given that onesize-fits-all policy solutions are not appropriate for these diverse conditions, I argue that increasing interjurisdictional competition can foster regional development and resilience. If individuals and businesses are able to 'vote with their feet' for the local jurisdictions they prefer, market-like incentives are brought to bear on government. This would limit government power, enable lower-risk policy experimentation, make government more responsive to citizen needs and allow for policy more suited to local circumstances.