“…While none of these attempts to find a game‐theoretical way of exiting the Hobbesian natural state has been wholly convincing (Kraus, ), the most relevant objection is that all are based on a severe misunderstanding of Hobbes. As Pasquino reminded us, the natural state is not: a starting point of the theory from which the possibility of exit must be explained, but rather [...] a rhetorically useful depiction of the consequences of wrongful understandings of men's civil and religious duties .…”
Section: Game‐theoretical ‘Fooles’ and The Limits Of Consequentialismmentioning
Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ (based on self‐interest and consequentialism) and the ‘revisionist’ (moralizing, or variously substantive) readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought.
“…While none of these attempts to find a game‐theoretical way of exiting the Hobbesian natural state has been wholly convincing (Kraus, ), the most relevant objection is that all are based on a severe misunderstanding of Hobbes. As Pasquino reminded us, the natural state is not: a starting point of the theory from which the possibility of exit must be explained, but rather [...] a rhetorically useful depiction of the consequences of wrongful understandings of men's civil and religious duties .…”
Section: Game‐theoretical ‘Fooles’ and The Limits Of Consequentialismmentioning
Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ (based on self‐interest and consequentialism) and the ‘revisionist’ (moralizing, or variously substantive) readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought.
“…Und gegenüber dem nachfolgenden 30 Kavka (1986) Kap. 4 und 5; für eine auführlichere kritische Diskussion der Bücher von Hampton und Kavka s. Kraus (1993). Befolgen rational vorteilhafter Normen erwartet Gauthier, daß sie über eine dispositionale Änderung der Präferenzen auch als rational-stabil ausgewiesen werden kann.…”
“…Rawls also uses the Prisoners' Dilemma in order to illustrate the argument for government provision of public goods (Rawls 1971: 269). It is also often used in reviews of contractarian arguments in order to illustrate these, see, e.g., Green (1988) and Kraus (1993). simultaneously the case, that each individual prefers to have his property rights respected while not respecting those of other individuals, i.e.…”
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
