The Limits of ex post Implementation

Jéhiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny; Zame, William R.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00675.x

Cited by 137 publications

(141 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…1 Some readers may interpret the term 'ex-post' differently, since the term is conventionally used in the context of single stage mechanisms, i.e., where the decisions of allocation and transfer are decided simultaneously (see, e.g., Jehiel et al (2006)) and it denotes that truthful reporting is optimal for every realization of the other agents' types even if the agent knew the other agents' types. In the context of two-stage mechanisms that we consider here, we feel that this equilibrium of full observability can be better called as 'subgame perfect' equilibrium.…”

Section: Background and Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even in a static setting, if the allocation and payment are decided simultaneously under the interdependent valuation setting, efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility (and therefore ex-post incentive compatibility) cannot be satisfied together (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001). In a later paper, Jehiel et al (2006) show that the only deterministic social choice functions that are ex-post implementable in generic mechanism design frameworks with multi-dimensional signals, interdependent valuations, and transferable utilities are constant functions. In view of these impossibility results, we are compelled to split the decisions of allocation and payment in two separate stages.…”

Section: Background and Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations

et al. 2015

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We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving according to a first order Markov process and is independent of the types of other agents. However, the valuation of an agent can depend on the types of other agents, which makes the problem fall into an interdependent valuation setting. Designing truthful mechanisms in this setting is non-trivial in view of an impossibility result which says that for interdependent valuations, any efficient and ex-post incentive compatible mechanism must be a constant mechanism, even in a static setting. Mezzetti (2004) circumvents this problem by splitting the decisions of allocation and payment into two stages. However, Mezzetti's result is limited to a static setting and moreover in the second stage of that mechanism, agents are weakly indifferent about reporting their valuations truthfully. This paper provides a first attempt at designing a dynamic mechanism which is efficient, strict ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational in a setting with interdependent values and Markovian type evolution.

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Section: Background and Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Background and Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations

et al. 2015

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“…al. [5] show that on a rich domain allowing for externalities/public goods as well as interdependent values, the only incentive compatible allocations are those precluding change.…”

Section: Concluding Commentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods

Ostroy

Segal

2011

Soc Choice Welf

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We show that efficient anonymous incentive compatible (dominant strategy) mechanisms for public goods eliminate externalities, i.e., each individual is unable to change the welfare of anyone else. The characterization is used to derive existence and non-existence results for models with a finite number of individuals and to explain existence results in the continuum. A similar characterization and conclusions are demonstrated for private goods in [7]. However, unlike private goods, elimination of externalities with public goods implies that individuals cannot change the outcome. Hence, such mechanisms provide only weak incentives for truth-telling.

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“…More recent work deals with ex post equilibria in multidimensional signal settings. Jehiel et al (2006) show that the only ex post implementable social choice functions in a generic class of environments are constant functions, whereas Bergemann and Morris (2008) provide conditions for full implementation in ex post equilibrium if the genericity requirement fails.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions

2015

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We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information-with private values-about the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation, i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) for any preference profile. JEL Classification

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The Limits of ex post Implementation

Cited by 137 publications

References 23 publications

Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations

Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations

No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods

On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions

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