The Limitations of the Introspective Method in Ethics

Sharp, Frank Chapman

doi:10.2307/2175613

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Without knowing exactly how the first biologists of Antiquity got going, I find Greene's account plausible enough. When Sharp (1896) began his initial studies of moral psychology late in the 19th century, he might have benefitted from surveying what people call "morality." Today, things are different.…”

Section: What We Do When We Define Morality: Four Contemporary Approa...mentioning

confidence: 99%

What We Do When We Define Morality (and Why We Need to Do It)

Dahl

2023

Psychological Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

All psychological research on morality relies on definitions of morality. Yet the various definitions often go unstated. When unstated definitions diverge, theoretical disagreements become intractable, as theories that purport to explain "morality" actually talk about very different things. This article argues for the importance of defining morality and considers four common ways of doing so: The linguistic, the functionalist, the evaluating, and the normative.Each has encountered difficulties. To surmount those difficulties, I propose a technical, psychological, empirical, and distinctive definition of morality: obligatory concerns with others' welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns. By articulating workable definitions of morality, psychologists can communicate more clearly across paradigms, separate definitional from empirical disagreements, and jointly advance the field of moral psychology.

show abstract

Section: What We Do When We Define Morality: Four Contemporary Approa...mentioning

confidence: 99%

What We Do When We Define Morality (and Why We Need to Do It)

Dahl

2023

Psychological Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In 1896, a professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin attacked the traditional method of simply writing about morality as a means of understanding it. Frank Chapman Sharp claimed, “Introspection can only be relied upon as a complete and safe method for the solution of ethical problems, only if the moral ideals and modes of judgment … are in the main identical” (Sharp, 1896, p. 279). Because Sharp believed this was not the case, an objective study was necessary to create a science of ethics.…”

Section: Moral Psychology Near the Turn Of The Centurymentioning

confidence: 99%

History of American morality research, 1894–1932.

Wendorf¹

2001

History of Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research on moral development existed long before the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. Early psychological opinions, along with empirical testing of moral judgments at the turn of the century, showed themes of the development of moral ideas in children and adults. After the appearance of Binet's intelligence tests, and guided by educational goals, moral testing began to reach its height, only to fail in reaching its objectives. These research endeavors did, however, provide some understanding of the nature of morality, the motives behind moral judgments, and the development of morality by using a scientific method.Nearly all of the research on moral development within psychology during the last 40 years has, in some way, been associated with the theoretical constructions and testing procedures devised by Lawrence Kohlberg (1963a). However, Kohlberg's research, begun while he was still a graduate student, offered a somewhat limited review of the existing literature on the psychology of morality and moral development. Like Piaget (1932/1960) before him, Kohlberg (1963b) was largely critical of, insensitive toward, or perhaps even ignorant of the fair body of American research conducted between 1894 (the date of the earliest published empirical study of morality) and 1932 (the date of publication of Piaget's landmark book).This disregard given by Piaget and Kohlberg-and perhaps many researchers since-is unfortunate. A researcher unfamiliar with the history of morality research might erroneously conclude that Piaget's (1932Piaget's ( /1960) and Kohlberg's (1963a) topic of inquiry was truly an original addition to the field of psychology. In fact, the quantitative, empirical study of morality and moral development has a rich and long history within the traditions of American psychology.Perhaps almost from its beginning, the psychology of morality and moral development has been deeply interested in providing and devising tests of an individual's moral values and development. However, these tests have varied in form and content over the years and can be classified into three main periods in which they were popular: (a) the years prior to the publication of Piaget's seminal work (1932/1960); (b) a period including the Piagetian model, the psychodynamic approach, and behavioristic models; and (c) a mid-century period during Craig A. Wendorf has taught statistics and social psychology in the Department of Psychology at Wayne State University. His primary research interests include the application of multilevel theory and statistical models to the understanding of issues of justice and fairness.Special thanks are extended to Susan H. McFadden for her comments and encouraging words on earlier versions of this article.

show abstract

What We Do When We Define Morality (And Why We Need to Do It)

Dahl¹

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

All psychological research on morality relies on definitions of morality. Yet the various definitions often go unstated. When unstated definitions diverge, theoretical disagreements become intractable, as theories that purport to explain “morality” actually talk about very different things. This article argues for the importance of defining morality and considers four common ways of doing so: The linguistic, the functionalist, the evaluating, and the normative. Each has encountered difficulties. To surmount those difficulties, I propose a technical, psychological, empirical, and distinctive definition of morality: obligatory concerns with others’ welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns. By articulating workable definitions of morality, psychologists can communicate more clearly across paradigms, separate definitional from empirical disagreements, and jointly advance the field of moral psychology.

show abstract

The Limitations of the Introspective Method in Ethics

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

What We Do When We Define Morality (and Why We Need to Do It)

What We Do When We Define Morality (and Why We Need to Do It)

History of American morality research, 1894–1932.

What We Do When We Define Morality (And Why We Need to Do It)

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About