The Limit of Bureaucratic Power in Organizations: The Case of the Chinese Bureaucracy

Zhou, Xueguang; Ai, Yun; Lian, Hong

doi:10.1108/s0733-558x(2012)0000034006

Cited by 29 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Doing so literally embeds political actors in economic institutions (Chen and Dickson, 2010) and creates social relations that are variously bureaucratic, instrumental, and affective (Michelson, 2007: 356). 2 Within the Chinese state bureaucracy, social relations have long been essential, not only for carrying out one's assigned tasks but also for advancing one's career (Zhou, 2010;Zhou, Ai, and Lian, 2012). Both lateral and vertical relations help officials manage uncertainty, gather information, mobilize resources to get things done, and solve unexpected problems.…”

Section: Political Embeddedness and Firm Performance In Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In these ways, officials use social ties to ''soften'' the iron cage of bureaucracy. Such social relations became even more important during the economic transition as a system of impersonal rules and incentives was put in place, greatly increasing the uncertainty officials faced (Yang, 2005;Landry, 2008;Zhou, Ai, and Lian, 2012). Because the social ties forged by working in the state bureaucracy are so valuable, they are likely to be maintained even when officials take positions in business concerns.…”

Section: Political Embeddedness and Firm Performance In Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China

Haveman

Jia

Shi

et al. 2016

Administrative Science Quarterly

300

252

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Economic transitions in countries that move from state planning and redistribution to market exchange create business opportunities but also uncertainty, because many interdependent factors-modes of exchange, types of products, and forms of organizations-are in flux. Uncertainty is even greater when the country's political institutions remain authoritarian because the rule of law is weak and state bureaucrats retain power over the economy. This study of listed firms in China, which has recently seen economic transition but persistent authoritarianism, shows that in such contexts, firms can reduce uncertainty by developing relationships with state bureaucrats, which help firms learn how state bureaucracies operate and engender trust between firms and bureaucrats. Together, knowledge and trust stabilize operations and help persuade bureaucrats to lighten regulatory burdens, grant firms access to statecontrolled resources, and improve government oversight. Our results show that as economic transitions proceed and uncertainty increases, business-state ties increasingly improve firm performance. We also investigate two likely contingencies, industry and firm size, and two important causal mechanisms, access to bank loans and protection from related-party loans, and show that the value of business-state relations varies over time, depending on the trajectory of both economic and political institutions.

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Section: Political Embeddedness and Firm Performance In Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Political Embeddedness and Firm Performance In Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China

Haveman

Jia

Shi

et al. 2016

Administrative Science Quarterly

300

252

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…First, state organizational capacity in low-income countries is essential to the success of many other developmental efforts (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; World Bank 2002, 2003; cf. Zhou, Ai, and Lian 2012). Second, we have little idea how to engender state organizational capacity.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Patchwork Leviathan: How Pockets of Bureaucratic Governance Flourish within Institutionally Diverse Developing States

McDonnell

2017

Am Sociol Rev

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Within seemingly weak states, exceptionally effective subunits lie hidden. These high-performing niches exhibit organizational characteristics distinct from poor-performing peer organizations, but also distinct from high-functioning organizations in Western countries. This article develops the concept of interstitial bureaucracy to explain how and why unusually high-performing state organizations in developing countries invert canonical features of Weberian bureaucracy. Interstices are distinct-yet-embedded subsystems characterized by practices inconsistent with those of the dominant institution. This interstitial position poses particular challenges and requires unique solutions. Interstices cluster together scarce proto-bureaucratic resources to cultivate durable distinction from the status quo, while managing disruptions arising from interdependencies with the wider neopatrimonial field. I propose a framework for how bureaucratic interstices respond to those challenges, generalizing from organizational comparisons within the Ghanaian state and abbreviated historical comparison cases from the nineteenth-century United States, early-twentieth-century China, mid-twentieth-century Kenya, and early-twenty-first-century Nigeria.

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“…In conclusion, a governance system without any emergency management deficiency does not exist (Christensen, Laegreid, & Rykkja, 2016). A highly centralized intergovernmental setup guarantees the resource allocation capacity of and public reverence for the central government; yet at the same time, it limits the decision-making flexibility and autonomy of local administrations (Zhou, Ai, & Lian, 2012). On the contrary, a decentralized, polycentric governance system endows local governments with high autonomy and purview to respond to contingencies; nonetheless, in the absence of a powerful central authority, a master plan is hard to develop, resulting in a lack of coordination, NIMBY-like problems, and resource-competition chaos (Fleming, McCartha, & Steelman, 2015).…”

Section: •Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Governance Shapes Emergency Management: China's Mixed Records in Responding to COVID-19

Wen¹,

Tang²,

Tao³

2020

Chinese Public Administration Review

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A nation’s governing system shapes its capacity for emergency preparedness and management. Designed to maintain the central government’s absolute authority, China’s governing system limits local governments’ initiative and capacity in responding to mass emergencies. By examining China’s fight against COVID-19, this essay dynamically demonstrates how the country’s governing regime constrains local officials’ initial response to the virus but facilitated large-scale mobilization once the crisis was recognized by the central leadership. Three essential factors for an adaptive emergency management system are identified: 1) raising the central government’s ability to recognize mass emergencies, 2) changing political incentives of local cadres, and 3) creating a flexible and efficient ad-hoc resource allocation mechanism. This study provides insights on how to enhance the resilience of a mass emergency management system within the constraints of existing governing institutions.

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The Limit of Bureaucratic Power in Organizations: The Case of the Chinese Bureaucracy

Cited by 29 publications

References 18 publications

The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China

The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China

Patchwork Leviathan: How Pockets of Bureaucratic Governance Flourish within Institutionally Diverse Developing States

How Governance Shapes Emergency Management: China's Mixed Records in Responding to COVID-19

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