The Life and Afterlife of Phenomenology in Archaeological Theory and Practice

Abstract

In 1994, Christopher Tilley published his treatise, A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments, that stimulated what has been referred to as the phenomenological “moment” in archaeology. Invoking Heideggerian phenomenology and following Merleau-Ponty, Tilley’s methods met with harsh criticism among many in the archaeological community. To some, Tilley’s hyper-interpretive methods lacked rigor and had the problem of imposing one’s own feelings and observations onto the people of the past without considering the cultural contexts and symbolic meanings imbued in past perceptions of landscapes. Tilley’s work leans heavily on embodiment, taking a humanistic approach that relies on the investigator’s own perceptions as the central source of data used for archaeological interpretation. Despite heavy criticism, his work prompted numerous revisions of his ideas and generated more nuanced approaches. Under criticism, explicitly phenomenological approaches soon gave way to the “Archaeology of the Senses,” which rests heavily on idealist approaches and the role of memory in sensorial experience. Still, the instigator’s own embodied experience with an emphasis on self-reflexivity remains the most important tool for interpretation. Though this is rarely made explicit in sensory studies, it is the underlying assumption in archeological reconstructions, virtual reality simulations, and thick descriptive narratives, all methods employed in these works. The question is, can a more rigorous methodology be developed that legitimizes the use of self as a tool for archaeological interpretations without being construed as ahistorical, homogenizing, or as a Western modernist universalism? Can we hope to understand the life experiences of people from the past using the only available tool at our disposal—ourselves? Cognitive science offers us a way forward in creating a more grounded phenomenological approach.