The Liberal Illusion of Uniqueness

Stern, Chadly; West, Tessa V.; Schmitt, Peter G.

doi:10.1177/0956797613500796

Cited by 57 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…On several issues, my collaborators and I find that conservatives exhibit a "truly false consensus effect"-assuming that like-minded others share their opinions more than they actually do, whereas liberals exhibit an "illusion of uniqueness"-assuming that like-minded others share their opinions less than they actually do (Rabinowitz, Latella, Stern, & Jost, 2016;Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014). Thus, we see an especially stark asymmetry when it comes to relational motivation (see also Stern & West, 2016).…”

Section: Ideological Asymmetries In Relational Motivationmentioning

confidence: 90%

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Jost

2017

Political Psychology

533

540

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Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway () demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.

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Section: Ideological Asymmetries In Relational Motivationmentioning

confidence: 90%

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Jost

2017

Political Psychology

533

540

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“…Further, people are likely most allured by conspiracy theories and movements that promise to fulfill the highest number of relevant needs at the same time [see 30]. For instance, because liberals tend to have stronger uniqueness needs [59], they might be especially drawn to conspiracy theories and related movements that are both unpopular and identify the "correct" conspirators (e.g., business people [60]).…”

Section: Implications and Predictions For Social Movementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories

Sternisko

Cichocka

Bavel

2020

Current Opinion in Psychology

140

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CitationSternisko, A., Cichocka, A. & Van Bavel, J. J. (in press). The dark side of social movements: Social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories. Current Opinion in Psychology. AcknowledgementsWe thank members of the Social Identity and Morality Lab for valuable feedback on a previous version of this article. We thank our research assistants Sahar Hafezi and Akiva Thalheim for their help with literature research and proofreading the article. AbstractSocial change does not always equal social progress--there is a dark side of social movements.We discuss conspiracy theory beliefs -beliefs that a powerful group of people are secretly working towards a malicious goal-as one contributor to destructive social movements. Research has linked conspiracy theory beliefs to anti-democratic attitudes, prejudice and non-normative political behavior. We propose a framework to understand the motivational processes behind conspiracy theories and associated social identities and collective action. We argue that conspiracy theories comprise at least two components -content and qualities-that appeal to people differently based on their motivations. Social identity motives draw people foremost to contents of conspiracy theories while uniqueness motives draw people to qualities of conspiracy

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“…In a study of Israeli voters, extreme left-wing supporters had a tendency for false uniqueness, which might be explained by their motivation to be perceived as a unique minority and distinct from conventional right-wing voters (Babad & Yacobos, 1993). Moreover, liberals tended to underestimate their similarity with other people due to their desire to feel unique (Rabinowitz, Latella, Stern, & Jost, 2016;Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014).…”

Section: N T E R N a T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The first is false consensus, whereby one has the tendency to falsely consider his or her opinion as commonly shared and alternative views as uncommon or deviant (Eveland & Glynn, 2008;Miller & McFarland, 1987;Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). The second is false uniqueness, whereby one has the tendency to falsely consider his or her opinion as unique and not shared by others (Bosveld, Koomen, van der Pligt, & Plaisier, 1995;Stern et al, 2014).…”

Section: N T E R N a T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the most common findings in social psychology and public opinion research is the mismatch between perceptions of others' opinions and actual personal opinions, which is known as pluralistic ignorance (Eveland & Glynn, 2008). While some people, often conservatives, overestimate how widely their own opinions are shared, others, often liberals, wrongly believe that their own opinions differ greatly from those of others (Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014). It has been suggested, though not empirically tested, that mismatches between perceived others' opinions and actual personal opinions do not occur in every circumstance, as they ''only hold sway over a society for a limited period of time'' (Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 2004, p. 350).…”

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confidence: 99%

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A Contingent Perspective on Pluralistic Ignorance: When the Attitudinal Object Matters

Eisner

Spini

Sommet

2019

International Journal of Public Opinion Research

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Although past research has suggested that pluralistic ignorance—a mismatch between perceptions of others’ opinions and actual personal opinions—does not occur in every circumstance, no studies have directly investigated variations among different attitude objects. Drawing upon theoretical and analytical approaches based on social representations, this study examines differences between personal opinions and perceived opinions of different groups toward same-sex female parenting (a newly debated attitude object) and working mothers (an older debated attitude object). Using data from a study (N = 743) conducted in Switzerland, the findings indicate that pluralistic ignorance occurs in opinions toward same-sex female parenting. Furthermore, the findings show that pluralistic ignorance arises from false consensus among conservatives and from false uniqueness among liberals.

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The Liberal Illusion of Uniqueness

Cited by 57 publications

References 30 publications

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories

A Contingent Perspective on Pluralistic Ignorance: When the Attitudinal Object Matters

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