The Leviathan's Rule by Law

Abstract

How and how well do authoritarian states rule by law? Extant literature does not fully answer these questions. By analyzing a unique set of time‐series data and archives, this article investigates a variety of legal measures (the death penalty, formal judicial guidance, and the revision and upgrade of substantive rules) implemented by the Chinese government in response to a critical threat–pipeline vandalization. The findings of this study cast doubt on the alleged deterrent effect of capital punishment. Moreover, it finds the supreme judicial bodies in China to be ready servants of the state's core interests, yet their service adds marginal value as legal dynamics at the local level are shaped mainly by the power distribution of relevant parties. Furthermore, the statutory upgrade does not benefit, and may even harm, pipeline safety. As the upgrade codified the status quo of the bargaining between the oil SOEs and the local governments, the statutory allocation of primary protective responsibilities to the former might have relieved the latter from active participation in pipeline protection that is essential to preventing oil thefts. Findings from this research contribute to the literatures on Chinese law and politics, capital punishment, and the rule by law in authoritarian regimes.

Order of Power in China’s Courts

“…43 Liu, Sida (2006), p. 92; Yang (2016); Xu (2017); Zuo (2016); Zhou, Peng, & Bao (2017). 44 Ng & He (2017), p. 110; see also Li, Ji (2015).…”

Judicial recentralization as political control: Evidence from the judicial leader rotation in China

“…Decentralization also gives rise to a fragmented governing structure. While Chinese courts are primarily designed as subordinates of the party‐state to strengthen its authoritarian rule (Li 2015; Lubman 1999; Michelson 2006), their leaders face conflicting policy goals from multiple political principals (Liberthal and Lampton 1992; Mertha 2009). As noted by Wang (2018), local court leaders have dual principals: the upper level court and the local party‐state apparatus.…”