The Lessons of the Border War

Abstract

A quarter of a century after the end of the Border War, the SANDF’s institutional memory of the conflict is slowly fading. And yet there are several lessons emanating from the war, which are relevant to the Defence Force. This article attempts to map out some of these lessons. These lessons are as follows. (1) The need for combined arms units such as 61 Mechanised Battalion Group and 4 SAI, being a mix of mechanised infantry, armoured cars, tanks, artillery and support troops on battalion level. (2) The importance of logistic support, something that was not always sufficient during Operations Moduler, Hooper and Packer in 1987–1988. (3) Reserve force units must be adequately retrained when utilised in operations. (4) During the war, there was a gap in the Army’s anti-aircraft capability. This gap has not been rectified since. (5) In order to be able to command the air above a battlefield, an aerial refuelling capability for the SAAF is essential. (6) The Army needs a proper air assault and maritime amphibious capability. (7) When deciding to engage in a warlike operation, avoid the incremental commitment, which characterised both Operation Savannah in 1975 and Moduler in 1988. (8) While the field units fight on the battlefield, do not micromanage things from above. As long as the units keep within the political and operational parameters set by the politicians and generals, let the field commanders exercise their own initiative. (9) Make a renewed study of the Army’s mobile warfare doctrine of the seventies and eighties, as developed by officers such as Major General Roland de Vries. (10) Lastly, see to it that officers are not just <em>trained</em>, but intellectually <em>educated</em> about war as well

Sensemaking training in preparation for effective mission command in the African battlespace

“…Mission command is based on Auftragstaktik (see Alibala, 2019;Scholtz, 2012;Shamir, 2010) and is grounded in the assumption that people want to take responsibility for organisational goal achievement and, given certain criteria, enjoy their work and do it willingly (SA Army, 2010). Mission command refers to "a command system in which responsibilities and authorities are delegated throughout the command line in order to stimulate initiative and leadership at all levels" (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004, p. 410).…”

“…It is therefore fundamentally a decentralised system of command (Shamir, 2017;Storr, 2003). The responsibilities and authority to make decisions are delegated throughout the command line (De Vries, 2013;Scholtz, 2012). The sub-commanders, who are involved in the operations in the field, make the decisions for actions based on their initiative and situational judgement, but within the boundaries of the superior commander's intent (Sjøvold & Nissestad, 2018).…”

“…Firstly, there should be a clear understanding of the superior commander's intent (Carpenter, 2016;De Vries, 2013;De Vries et al, 2017;Harvard, 2013;Ploumis & Pilalis, 2018). The explanation should be clear and specific, focusing on the outcome (what) and its justification (why) (see Scholtz, 2012). Vogelaar and Kramer (2004, p. 412) note that the autonomous decision-making along the line of command -…”

“…By standardising drills and procedures and conducting joint training exercises, leaders at all levels can execute their mission as they see fit without compromising the overall aim of the commander (De Vries, 2013;De Vries et al 2017). Training and education ensure that commanders at all levels have the necessary skills and competence to make decisions independently (Nillson, 2021;Scholtz, 2012). Although practical operational experience is important, mission command requires a minimum standard of training in tactical skills (Storr, 2003), but also education to help them understand scenarios with which they are confronted, enable effective analysis of different possible scenarios, and develop plans for further action (Ploumis, 2020).…”