The Legitimation of Repression in Autocracies

Abstract

In research on authoritarianism, both legitimation and repression have received growing attention since the late 2000s. However, these two strategies of political rule do not form separate pillars of power; they are interlinked and affect each other. Autocrats not only rule with an iron fist, but they also seek to legitimize their use of repression vis-à-vis at least some of their citizens and the outside world. These legitimizing discourses are part of political communication in autocracies and can be studied using the approach of framing. So far, few researchers of the protest–repression nexus have studied how protesters are being framed by officials in autocracies. The communication of repression varies widely across autocracies. Authoritarian incumbents differ in their degree of openness vs. opacity, impacting also on how they publicize, admit to, or conceal certain forms of repression. When choosing to justify acts of repression, multiple factors influence which types of justification are used. One decisive factor is against which targets repression is employed. In framing the targets of repression in a certain way, autocratic elites pursue a twin strategy in that they seek to attain the approval of certain audiences and to deter potential or actual dissidents. Furthermore, justifications diverge regarding which actors use them and towards which audiences. Past experiences and regime characteristics also impact on how repression is justified. This research program offers great potential for studying state–society relations in autocracies. It cuts across research on political violence, authoritarian legitimation, and political communication. For understanding the persistence of autocracies in times of contention, it is an important piece in the puzzle of authoritarian survival strategies illuminating the “dark side” of legitimation.

Civil Society Between Repression and Cooptation: Adjusting to Shrinking Space in Cambodia

“…The Cambodian constitution, adopted in 1993, provides for multi-party democracy, the separation of powers, and fundamental civic freedoms (e.g., Karbaum 2011, 117). De facto, however, the CPP has monopolised political power, as illustrated by the FHI (2022), which has continuously labelled the country as “Not Free”.…”

“…Relatedly, it also shows that international donors became sceptical about the ability of NGOs to push for democratic development already from the early 2000s onwards, leading many to cut their funding to civil society (ibid., 46). In addition, both the World Bank and various other international donors, such as the European Union, began to promote the engagement of CSOs in policy dialogues with the regime around this time (Karbaum 2011, 126).…”

“…Traditionally, the repression strategy employed by the CPP included the defamation, arrest, and assassination of oppositional activists, leading to a culture of fear (Karbaum 2011, 119–121; 131; see also, Norén-Nilsson 2019). Recently, however, the CPP has increasingly shifted to more subtle forms of repression, such as the filing of lawsuits against its critics.…”

“…1 In addition, the CPP has preserved its power through cooptation, incorporating strategically relevant groups, such as businessmen, cadre officials, and local elites, into its patron-client networks (e.g., Young 2019, 39; Peou 2019). However, the overall resource base of the state has remained limited and the regime has long been highly aid-dependent (e.g., Karbaum 2011, 136), making the state apparatus primarily an instrument for the accumulation of private benefits through corruption, rather than an institution offering direct access to rents. For instance, an opposition politician claimed that civil servants, police chiefs, and local governors had to pay between 10,000 and 1 Mio USD in bribes for their placements, investments made lucrative through the bribes they could subsequently elicit from citizens.…”

Taming a Paper Tiger? A Political Economy of Support for the Repression of the Business Elite

“…In the next section, I develop a political economy account of public support for the repression of the business elite and shed light on its micro-level determinants. 6 One scope condition is the informational and coercive capacity of the regime (Josua 2021;Dimitrov 2023). 7 Widespread purges and executions are indeed possible, as Saddam Husein did in 1979 to most members of his elite support group (Ezrow and Frantz 2011, 117; see also Li and Manion 2022).…”