The Legitimation of Post-crisis Capitalism in the United Kingdom: Real Wage Decline, Finance-led Growth and the State

Abstract

Since the 2008 financial crisis, capitalist development in the UK has been marked by both continuity and change. Whilst the Coalition government effectively re-established the UK's finance-led growth model it simultaneously broke with the legitimation strategy which New Labour had advanced in the pre-crisis conjuncture The Coalition advanced a distinctive two nations strategy which sought to secure a limited but durable base of support in a context of fiscal consolidation. This strategy was conditional upon the deep and unprecedented period of real wage decline which took hold in the post-crisis conjuncture. However, the Coalition successfully transformed this potential liability into a political asset constructing a series of moralised antagonisms between wage earners and welfare recipients on the one hand and private and public sector workers, on the other. Whilst this strategy secured a limited base of popular support, it also re-embedded a series of structural weaknesses within post-crisis UK capitalism. These imbalances are likely to undermine the stability of the UK s finance-led growth model in the future and will condition British politics as the country embarks upon the process of leaving of the EU.

Comparing Capitalisms: Debates, Controversies and Future Directions

“…We argue that there is a need to explain not only changes in the levels of income inequality and job (and occupational) security, in general, but also differences between LMEs and other types of market economy and, indeed, between LMEs themselves. By focusing on overall growth and employment, the existing literature tends to downplay systemic outcomes that still leave many (or, indeed, most) worse off, in turn making for socio-political problems (Lavery, 2018). In other words, the recursive relationship between inequality experienced by individuals and societal changes is important (Halford and Strangleman, 2009; Strangleman, 2017; Watson, 2009), and, indeed, may eclipse broadly positive ‘headline’ figures around growth.…”

Capitalist Convergence? European (dis?)Integration and the Post-crash Restructuring of French and European Capitalisms

“…These developments challenge a teleological assumption of ever-increasing or stable integration within Europe contained within both frameworks (see Rosamond 2016: 865), wherein disintegration is either not considered or referred to fleetingly (Johnston and Regan 2018: 146). Yet, as early empirical accounts indicate, Brexit is reshaping Europe's competitive and regulatory dynamics, auguring financial market fragmentation (see Lavery et al 2018;2019;Quaglia and Howarth 2018). Drawing upon the nascent 'disintegration' Post-dirigisme and the state-industry-finance nexus Unlike VoC and GM's simple, bifurcating frameworks for understanding European capitalist restructuring, the concept of post-dirigisme foregrounds the possibility of 'alternative types of capitalism distinguished by the extent and character of state intervention in the economy' (Jackson and Deeg 2008: 699, see also Schmidt 2002Schmidt , 2003Schmidt , 2009, and demonstrates the need for variety within comparative capitalisms typologies which extends beyond two.…”

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Beyond populism and institutionalism: Anti‐populism and the management of austerity in Spain

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