The 'Legislative Backbone' keeping the Institution upright? The Role of European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process

Neuhold, Christine

doi:10.2139/ssrn.302785

Cited by 46 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…A further implication of this theory is that policy-seeking MEPs should be more attracted to remaining on European Parliament committees the greater their degree of legislative activity. These committees are where the detailed legislative work of the EP is carried out (Neuhold 2001;Ringe 2010).…”

Section: Theorising Meps' Careers: Why Should Meps Want To Stay In Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tenure, turnover and careers in the European Parliament: MEPs as policy-seekers

Whitaker¹

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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Given the considerable increase in its powers over recent decades this paper asks how far the European Parliament (EP) is an attractive place to build a legislative career.Using a theory of MEPs as policy-seekers, it shows that MEPs are indeed building careers in this supranational institution. Turnover is in decline in the EP and on its committees, average length of service has increased and greater proportions of MEPs aspire to stay than previously. Looking at the 30 years since direct elections began, policy influence and office benefits are associated with lower likelihood of exiting the EP while being on the geographical periphery of the EU makes MEPs more likely to leave. KEY WORDS

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Section: Theorising Meps' Careers: Why Should Meps Want To Stay In Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The data also allow us to look at stints not just in the EP as a whole but in its committee system where the detailed legislative work of the Parliament takes place (Neuhold 2001;Ringe 2010). If MEPs are engaging in policy-seeking behaviour we would expect them to want to remain on EP committees that have policy influence.…”

Section: Tenure In the Ep's Committeesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tenure, turnover and careers in the European Parliament: MEPs as policy-seekers

Whitaker¹

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…Normally, there are no time limits during its first reading. MEPs involved "view it as a period for discussion, for gathering expertise, laying down their respective positions, and clarifying (mainly) technical questions" (Neuhold 2001). However, because of time pressure created by the upcoming enlargement, "the EP did not control the amount of issues" (Danish civil servant, A3).…”

Section: Codecision and Informal Trialogue: The Role Of The European mentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy Making on Data Exclusivity in the European Union: From Industrial Interests to Legal Realities

Adamini¹,

Maarse²,

Versluis³

et al. 2009

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law

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After lengthening the duration of patents to twenty years in 1984, the pharmaceutical industry has turned to data exclusivity as a major vehicle for extending market protection, even after patents expire. Such protections give companies the power to tax consumers for innovation by charging above-market prices. This article draws upon unique information to describe how key actors lengthened data exclusivity for patented drugs to postpone generic competition in the European Union (EU) just before ten new members joined it. We explore the political route and the interests of different actors to understand the process by which industrial interests are translated into legal realities in the world's largest harmonized market. Several factors influenced the outcome, including the role of the pharmaceutical unit of the Directorate General for Enterprise of the European Commission in promoting the interests of the innovative branch of the industry, the time pressure to find a viable compromise before EU enlargement, and the heterogeneous preferences of the other actors. The case illustrates the inherent tension between the desire of both health care administrators and patients for high-quality, low-cost medicines and the objective of the innovator pharmaceutical industry to find and approve new drugs that are price protected and sell them in a way that maximizes revenues.

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“…In effect, most of the detailed parliamentary work is conducted in and by committees, the majority of substantive changes and compromises are constructed inside the committee, and committee work is the most time-consuming activity for parliamentarians and defines the focus of their work (Kreppel 2005;Corbett et al 2005;Neuhold 2001). As the powers of the EP have increased over time, so has the role of its committees in shaping legislation, especially as they have progressively acquired policy-specific expertise (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003).…”

Section: The Committee System Of the Epmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Shadow rapporteurs (often referred to simply as "shadows") inform the other members of their political groups of the progress of the deliberation and negotiation process, give them recommendations, draw up amendments, lead the discussion and rally the troops when "their" issue is discussed in committee or plenary, or within their group. This position has become necessary because many dossiers discussed in the EP today are so highly technical that MEPs not dealing with the proposal directly are unfamiliar with the details of the proposal under consideration (Neuhold 2001).…”

Section: The Committee System Of the Epmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy Preference Formation in Legislative Politics: Structures, Actors, and Focal Points

Ringe

2005

American Journal of Political Science

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This dissertation introduces and tests a model of policy preference formation in legislative politics. Emphasizing a dynamic relationship between structure, agent, and decision-making process, it ties the question of policy choice to the dimensionality of the normative political space and the strategic actions of parliamentary agenda-setters. The model proposes that structural factors, such as ideology, shape policy preferences to the extent that legislative specialists successfully link them to specific policy proposals through the provision of informational focal points. These focal points shift attention toward particular aspects of a legislative proposal, thus shaping the dominant interpretation of its content and consequences and, in turn, individual-level policy preferences. The propositions of the focal point model are tested empirically with data from the European Parliament (EP), using both qualitative (interview data, content analyses of parliamentary debates) and quantitative methods (multinomial logit regression analyses of roll-call votes). The findings have implications for our understanding of politics and law-making in the European Union and for the study of legislative decision-making more generally.

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The 'Legislative Backbone' keeping the Institution upright? The Role of European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process

Cited by 46 publications

References 19 publications

Tenure, turnover and careers in the European Parliament: MEPs as policy-seekers

Tenure, turnover and careers in the European Parliament: MEPs as policy-seekers

Policy Making on Data Exclusivity in the European Union: From Industrial Interests to Legal Realities

Policy Preference Formation in Legislative Politics: Structures, Actors, and Focal Points

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