The Legal Enforceability of Articles 8.2 and 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: The Case of the Netherlands

Karapetian, Gohar; Toebes, Brigit

doi:10.1163/23527072-00101001

Cited by 2 publications

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“…The legal case proved unsuccessful. The Dutch court concluded that the Guidelines did not form part of the FCTC and, as such, were not considered legally binding 59. However, the case did result in a more strict approach to interpreting Article 5.3 by the government 59 60.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Dutch court concluded that the Guidelines did not form part of the FCTC and, as such, were not considered legally binding 59. However, the case did result in a more strict approach to interpreting Article 5.3 by the government 59 60. In September 2015, a year after the case, the Ministry of Health distributed a document to parliament clarifying the government’s interpretation of Article 5.3 61.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tobacco industry access to policy elites and the implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Willemsen¹,

Fooks

2019

Tob Control

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IntroductionArticle 5.3 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) aims to prevent tobacco industry interference with public health policy. The degree of protection depends on several factors: the interpretation of Article 5.3 by governments; the presence of codes of practice; and the effectiveness of industry lobbying versus public health advocacy. We examine these factors with reference to the Dutch government’s interpretation of Article 5.3.MethodsWe searched the Dutch Tobacco Industry Special Collection, part of the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents archive, containing more than 1100 Dutch government documents.ResultsBetween 2007 and 2012, under consistent pressure from the industry, an initial strict view of Article 5.3 gave way to increased contact with the industry. The industry tried to shift the governance of tobacco policy back to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Around 2010, Dutch public health advocates began to use Article 5.3. Efforts included naming and shaming government contact with the industry, parliamentary questions about industry–government contact, a report outlining how Article 5.3 should be observed and, most importantly, a court case. In response to this, the government produced a formal code of practice, which was used to prevent industry involvement in the development of a new National Prevention Accord.DiscussionThe Dutch government’s initial decision not to codify Article 5.3 created an administrative environment in which health ministers’ interpretation of Article 5.3 was able to shift according to their political beliefs. The findings support the recommendation that Parties to the FCTC take a strict approach and formally codify Article 5.3 to ensure effective implementation.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tobacco industry access to policy elites and the implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Willemsen¹,

Fooks

2019

Tob Control

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“…The case was not successful, but it did result in a review and revision of the guidelines to ensure better implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC. 60 Whether a treaty will provide such opportunities depends largely on the extent to which international law is directly enforceable within the courts of that country. In many, it may not be, and there may also be rules about standing and admissibility that limit the ability to bring such cases in practice.…”

Section: Civil Society Litigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Difference Would a Binding International Legal Instrument on Alcohol Control Make? Lessons from the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control’s Impact on Domestic Litigation

Zhou¹

2020

Eur. j. risk regul.

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Since the adoption of the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2003, public health professionals have debated similar conventions covering other health risks, including potentially a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control. Much of this debate has focused on the merits of binding versus non-binding instruments in terms of commitments at the international level. In this paper, I draw on lessons from the WHO FCTC to discuss instead what the difference between binding and non-binding international legal instruments might mean for domestic legal frameworks for implementing regulatory measures for alcohol control. The paper looks at possible impacts on the authority of various national authorities to implement new measures, the ability of civil society to bring cases compelling more comprehensive regulatory measures and the defence of litigation brought by commercial-sector actors to prevent, delay or weaken the implementation of laws and regulations. It reflects on what lessons these might have for alcohol control governance.

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The Legal Enforceability of Articles 8.2 and 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: The Case of the Netherlands

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Tobacco industry access to policy elites and the implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Tobacco industry access to policy elites and the implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

What Difference Would a Binding International Legal Instrument on Alcohol Control Make? Lessons from the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control’s Impact on Domestic Litigation

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