The legal ambiguity of advanced assistive bionic prosthetics: Where to define the limits of ‘enhanced persons’ in medical treatment

Abstract

The rapid advancement of artificial (computer) intelligence systems (CIS) has generated a means whereby assistive bionic prosthetics can become both more effective and practical for the patients who rely upon the use of such machines in their daily lives. However, de lege lata remains relatively unspoken as to the legal status of patients whose devices contain self-learning CIS that can interface directly with the peripheral nervous system. As a means to reconcile for this lack of legal foresight, this article approaches the topic of CIS-nervous system interaction and the impacts it may have on the legal definition of “persons” under the law. While other literature of this nature centres upon notions of transhumanism or self-enhancement, the approach herein approached is designed to focus solely upon the legal nature of independent CIS actions when operating alongside human subjects. To this end, it is hoped that further discussion on the topic can be garnered outside of transhumanist discourse to expedite legal consideration for how these emerging relationships ought to be received by law-generating bodies internationally.

On human genome manipulation and Homo technicus: the legal treatment of non-natural human subjects

“…What standards should judiciaries and legislative bodies base any potential notions for the "natural" human subject when developing precedence or policy that would delineate this group of humans from the rest of society in this circumstance? Positing that human society will-at some near point of time-be required to consider that the rights or protections given to a "natural" human are distinctly different than they would be for a "non-natural" human [22,23], 12 such standards are essential to expound and ruminate upon. It cannot be rational for humanity in this day-and-age to continuously view the life that holds less convenience to be less in need of protections than a life with more convenience-though this model remains the norm depending on the part of the world one looks [17].…”

“…Even if one were to concede that only select instantiations of ACIS could rationally be categorised as holding the qualities argued to be essential for moral status by Beauchamp and Childress, 18 we must still consider the implications of how the union between ACIS and human consciousness will challenge the notions of "human" identity, liability, and labour-centred "worth" [21][22][23]. 19 Of course, this argument does not mean to claim that all ACIS-human mergers will necessarily change some fundamental phenomenological aspect of reality-merely that the introduction of such mergers with self-learning ACIS specifically will introduce this uncertainty regarding our interpretation of our environs, if not with select dormant or static ACIS ( [23], p. 2).…”

“…A concern emerges from this in a bioethical vein of thinking, however; namely, in how long this naïveté can last in the face of humanity's quest to supersede its biological limitations. After all, we continue to claim a desire to develop an artificial general intelligence system without quantifying the extent to which intelligence is to be measured when compared to humanity [23,27,31]. Such motions are dangerous in the potentiality for aspects of "human" intelligence to be considered insufficient, even though they may be protected via other means in various areas of jurisprudence [16,23], thereby developing a sense that these unincorporated aspects of "human" intelligence are insufficient to serve as representative of humanity in a more general sense [37].…”

“…What remains to be changed, however, are the foundations underlying the ethical and legal concerns presented within this myriad of academic and scientific literature. Whether these underlying concerns are simply of no significance to the typical individual in light of their new-found ability to extend their natural lifespan or the consequence of a society where state authorities rarely challenge individual freedoms, the reality remains that a more extensive discussion on the implications of HA remains relatively stagnant at the judicial and legislative levels [22,23]. 4 It could be said that this stagnation is not an inherently "bad" state of being for the topic given the relative political "charge" it holds over members of society-though this is again an inherently naïve position to maintain given how fast technology is evolving.…”

“…Although society may not run across legal challenges concerning the determination of a given individual's right to claim legal personality under de lege lata 5 for another decade or so when technologically enhanced [23], 6 it ought not to be ignored that these questions are inevitably coming to the fore regardless their relevance in current discourses. Given the recent international cries for "racial" justice in this global pandemic 7 in the USA and abroad, this topic has become more critical than ever to address.…”