The Legacy of the ‘Coloured Revolutions’: The Case of Kazakhstan

Ostrowski, Wojciech

doi:10.1080/13523270902861053

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…In response to the 2001 anti-regime rallies, Nazarbayev had gutted the main rival party, DCK ( Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan ), by jailing its main leaders in 2002. Internal fractions and inexperience then did the rest (Ostrowski, 2009). In 2002 the Majlis passed a set of reforms banning ethnic, religious, and gender-based parties and introducing membership requirements (Ó Beacháin, 2005) which neutralized the main social cleavages (Russian/Kazakh and Islamic/secular).…”

Section: The Four Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12 In March 2005, a new ban on political rallies and protests targeting electoral results 13 had effectively stifled any possible animosity in the scarcely-covered campaign. A 5-year rise in oil revenues allowed Nazarbayev to promise higher public wages and more public housing (Ostrowski, 2009). His incumbent advantage approaching the election was remarkable, with approval ratings measured at 70% in September of 2005.…”

Section: The Four Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Competition, stakes, and falling electoral participation in Central Asia and the Caucasus: A comparative analysis

Lioy

Dawson

2020

Journal of Eurasian Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Between 2005 and 2015, a drastic wave of decline in voter turnout affected a series of presidential elections in Central Asia and the Caucasus. To explain this phenomenon, we perform an innovative comparative study using news coverage of four electoral case studies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Armenia. This analysis is then used to build a new theory, which explains significant falls in participation as outcomes of a composite process of strengthening of incumbent regimes, weakening of oppositions, and generally reduced electoral stakes. Common patterns are identified across all four cases, suggesting that the willingness of the people to refuse to turn out to vote appears largely independent of the level of democracy. We maintain that, across the region, citizens chose to spurn the ballot box because of reduced electoral competition.

show abstract

Section: The Four Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Four Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition, stakes, and falling electoral participation in Central Asia and the Caucasus: A comparative analysis

Lioy

Dawson

2020

Journal of Eurasian Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Generally, the literature on the colored revolutions in postcommunist politics has focused largely on either macrostructural or economic reasons for their occurrence (Radnitz, ; Way, ; Nikolayenko, ), the diffusion of colored revolutions across the region (Beissinger, ; for a criticism, see Way, ), regime reactions to colored revolutions (especially to contain or preempt such revolts) (Finkel and Brudny, ; Silitsky, ; Way, ), or the individual psychological factors and motivations for participation in mass protests that led to the color revolutions in the first place (Beissinger, ; Tucker, ). Further, there has been some limited work on the political consequences of the colored revolutions (see, for instance, Kalandadze and Orenstein, ; Ostrowski, ) but this work has focused on macro‐level political consequences (such as the emergence of democracy) or on a single country (Beissinger, ; Ostrowski, ). What is generally missing from the literature is the examination of the effects of the colored revolutions on individual‐level attitudes that support democracy—particularly social trust and institutional trust.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Colored Revolutions, Interpersonal Trust, and Confidence in Institutions: The Consequences of Mass Uprisings*

Ishiyama

Pechenina

2016

Social Science Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Objective. Recent upheavals in the Middle East raise a number of questions regarding the consequences of mass uprisings. We examine the impact that earlier peaceful revolutions had on interpersonal and institutional trust in the postcommunist world. Methods. Data were collected from eight countries using two waves from the World Values Survey, three of which had experienced a colored revolt. The article uses mixed effects logit analysis and quasi-experimental techniques. Results. Levels of social trust are much less in countries where a colored revolution occurred than in countries that had not experienced such an uprising. However, confidence in political institutions increased in contrast to countries that had not experienced an uprising. Conclusion. The level of interpersonal trust is not necessarily connected to the level of institutional trust. The decline in interpersonal trust in post-colored-revolution societies does not bode well for the development of democracy after mass upheaval. TX 76203-5017 John.Ishiyama@unt.edu . The authors will share all data and coding for replication purposes.1 Although recognizing that there is much conceptual debate in the literature on the definition of "revolutions" in this article, we refer to these uprisings in postcommunist countries as "revolutions" since they were referred to in this way by the popular media and the press. Further, although it could be argued that what occurred was not "revolutionary" in that no "progress" toward democracy was made afterward, in this article we conceptualize "revolutionary" as simply the collapse of the previous political administration and its replacement with the opposition as the result of mass protests over fraudulent election results.2 To be sure, we do not wish to make universal claims that stretch far beyond the countries included in this study, which are all in one region of the world, all of which were postcommunist, and all of which were semi-authoritarian regimes. Thus we do not claim that the findings apply to all popular uprisings (such as SOCIAL

show abstract

“…Por un lado, en cuanto al marco político, en el nivel central destaca la implementación de compromisos e iniciativas para acomodar una pluralidad de élites en instituciones donde compartir poder y acceso a recursos. Entre ellas destacan el Parlamento o el partido oficialista Nur Otan (Ostrowski, 2009). En la esfera económica se cumple ese mismo objetivo, el de la inclusión de las principales agrupaciones políticas informales, con la creación de holdings estatales tales como Samruk-Kazyna.…”

Section: Uzbekistán: Alta Concentración Del Poder De Decisión Y Débilunclassified

La diversificación del poder en los Estados neopatrimonialistas de Asia central

Ramas¹

2015

BICE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Legacy of the ‘Coloured Revolutions’: The Case of Kazakhstan

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Competition, stakes, and falling electoral participation in Central Asia and the Caucasus: A comparative analysis

Competition, stakes, and falling electoral participation in Central Asia and the Caucasus: A comparative analysis

Colored Revolutions, Interpersonal Trust, and Confidence in Institutions: The Consequences of Mass Uprisings*

La diversificación del poder en los Estados neopatrimonialistas de Asia central

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About