The legacy of subalternity and Gramsci’s national–popular: populist discourse in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Abstract

Drawing on Laclau's concept of populist discourse and Gramsci's 'national-popular collective will', and using the case of Iran, this article puts forward the idea of legacy of subalternity in the context of post-revolution governments. The concept of 'national-popular collective will' facilitates an understanding of how the popular subject is constructed and the meanings embedded in that process. It is argued that Islamic Republic elites articulate a populist discourse that constructs the 'self' (the Islamic Republic) as synonymous with 'the people'. Embedded in this discursive construction is a legacy of subalternity that goes back to the 1979 Revolution's populist discourse.

Ideological Codependency and Regional Order: Iran, Syria, and the Axis of Refusal

“…Promises to redistribute wealth and increase political inclusion, alongside opposition to imperialism and Zionism, constituted central motifs for the movements that consolidated state power in Iran, Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere, emanating as they did from the “organic ideology” of the publics that supported them. Populist governments view themselves as champions of the people’s will against the predations of a corrupt elite (Abrahamian 1993; Holliday 2016; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). In the Middle East context, Ba’thism and Islamism represent “willed” ideologies, but their contribution to general ideological power rests on the resonance they have with broader organic ideologies through which individuals “acquire consciousness of their position.”…”

“…Promises to redistribute wealth and increase political inclusion, alongside opposition to imperialism and Zionism, constituted central motifs for the movements that consolidated state power in Iran, Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere, emanating as they did from the "organic ideology" of the publics that supported them. Populist governments view themselves as champions of the people's will against the predations of a corrupt elite (Abrahamian 1993;Holliday 2016;Verbeek and Zaslove 2015).…”

Populism, the International and Methodological Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran–Israel Nexus

“…In other words, the now ruling elite needs to maintain its legitimacy by reasserting its populist credentials. This is done by continuing to divide the political arena into two groups (Holliday, 2016: 924).…”

“…For instance, Donald Trump’s election as US president highlights the relationship between the US, Israel and Iran. Notably, Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Islamic Republic of Iran have each been identified as ‘populist’ (Abrahamian, 1993; Ansari, 2008; Dorraj and Dodson, 2009; Filc, 2011; Gusterson, 2017; Holliday, 2016). For Trump (2017a, 2017b), Iran is a ‘rogue regime’, a ‘threat’, and a destabilising, destructive force that fuels sectarianism and requires isolating.…”

“…The article first puts forward the conceptual framework. It then highlights the historical and intellectual context of the 1979 Revolution through an adaptation of the 'legacy of subalternity' (Holliday, 2016) before showing how Iran simultaneously constructs Israel and global order as part of populist discourses.…”