The Legacies of State Corporatism in Korea: Regulatory Capture in the Sewol Ferry Tragedy

Abstract

Regarding the causes of the Sewol ferry accident that claimed 304 lives in April 2014, some scholars have blamed neoliberal reforms such as deregulation and privatization for the safety regulatory failure. Others have highlighted the role of industry influence and corruption. Our analysis shows that regulatory capture was the crucial causal factor; moreover, this capture was institutionalized from the state-corporatist arrangements of the authoritarian period rather than reflecting new arrangements under the democratic era or corruption per se. The delegation of the critical safety regulation enforcement to the shipping industry association was not introduced as a neoliberal reform but in the context of state corporatism of the Park Chung-hee regime. Democratic governments continued to protect the monopoly of the lucrative Incheon–Jeju ferry business, contrary to neoliberal logic. The legacies of state corporatism persist despite post-financial crisis reform.

Leviathan for Sale: Maritime Police Privatization, Bureaucratic Corruption, and the Sewol Disaster

“…Although there is little verifiable evidence of gifts and bribes in the case of Korea's maritime police (You and Park 2017, 97), there is substantial, official empirical evidence of parachute appointments for which we argue has been a critical component of the privatization calculus and process. This trend continues despite statutes in place which, in theory, should limit such employment in firms closely relevant to the former bureaucrat's area of responsibility for a period of three years following retirement.…”

“…Our study is further unique in its arguments that emphasize the legacies of state corporatism as a cause of regulatory capture (see You and Park 2017). State corporatism, which was established in South Korea prior to its move into the democratic camp in 1987, cannot fully explain why the role of the state in sea rescue declined during the democratic period and how a specific form of privatization was selected by the government.…”

“…Bringing the issue of corruption into the causal mix of privatization necessitates a discussion of how we conceptualize it. First, we focus less specifically on “money politics” or “outlier” cases in which individuals abuse power for personal gain, aspects of which are at the heart of oft-cited definitions of corruption (see Kang 2004; Warren 2004; You and Park 2017). While such outlier instances of corruption certainly occur, focusing on illicit bribes or other monetary benefits as a key defining feature fails to capture instances of deviant behavior that is not necessarily, or at least not immediately, monetarily conditioned.…”

“…2.As You and Park (2017) indicated, the 2001 revision of the Act prohibited high-level officials’ post-retirement appointments not only in profit-oriented business associations but also NPOs. However, it permitted an exception for those organizations that carry out the tasks delegated by central or local governments.…”

Has South Korean democracy hit a glass ceiling? Institutional‐cultural factors and limits to democratic progress

“…Several accounts of the Sewol tragedy and its cause and political consequences are available (Suh & Kim, 2017; You & Park, 2017). Here, I draw on existing accounts to indicate how political outcomes related to the Sewol's investigation were in part a derivative of a political culture oriented toward protecting the president and intolerant of dissent and criticism.…”