The League of Polish Families between East and West, past and present

Abstract

Historical legacies play an important role in the rise of radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. This article conducts an in-depth study of the trajectory of a particular radical right party, the League of Polish Families, in a particular Central and East European country, Poland. The central objective of the article is to highlight that, although there are important similarities between the League of Polish Families and other radical right parties in both Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe, the League of Polish Families differs in some respects, such as the composition of electorate and ideology from these parties. The article shows that the observed differences have their roots in the Polish historical legacy, that on some accounts deviates from the historical legacies present in other Central and East European countries.

Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? Determinants of Public Support for European Integration and Opposition to It before and after Accession

“…This analysis examines if and how the dependent variable is shaped, before and after accession, in two distinctive ways, and focuses on the study of domestic proxies. As Catholicism has represented a core national value in Poland (see De Lange and Guerra, 2009), it also tests the religious variable. Religion can represent a salient ‘cultural and institutional force’ (Broughton and ten Napel, 2000, p. xix).…”

“…It gloomily warned that ‘under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU could seize elderly people's savings and homes and [could] take children off people who suffer from mild forms of alcoholism or depression or who do not own a family home’ (Phillips, 2009). In Poland, public support for the EU dropped to 55 per cent in May 1999, 2 and the rhetoric of Eurosceptic parties – particularly the use of Catholicism against ‘secular’ Europe as used by the League of Polish Families with the support of Father Rydzyk and Radio Maryja – had an impact on fears and concerns emerging after the opening of the negotiation process in spring 1998 (see De Lange and Guerra, 2009; Guerra, 2012). Finally, all the previous studies on Poland considered ‘religion’ as the variable answering to ‘church attendance’.…”

“…While before accession, religion was used in the Eurosceptic narrative and was not significant, after joining the EU Catholicism could not possibly be a Eurosceptic issue. The EU could not be framed as threatening Polish values and identity (De Lange and Guerra, 2009) as ultra‐conservative political parties – in the Polish case: the League of Polish Families – could not fuel polemic domestic debates on religion. Therefore, it is also possible to explain the reason for the non‐significance of religion between 1994 and 2004.…”

Without losing my religion: the dilemmas of EU integration in Poland

“…It resisted in opposition to the Slavic tribes at the time of the Piast family, and in the Eighteenth century it represented Polish unity against the devastation following the three partitions. Even though the Polish state was divided, the Polish nation could persist and national religious symbols helped overcome any divisions (De Lange, Guerra 2009). In a narrative discourse and in the literature, Poland has often been transposed to the Catholic idea of purity and sacrifice for Europe.…”

Digging into the breeding ground: insights into the electoral performance of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe

“…Webb and White 2007; on PRR parties, see Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009;De Lange and Guerra 2009). As far as PRR parties are concerned, however, the way their core ideological features of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism are articulated on the two sides of the former Iron Curtain is fairly distinctive.…”