“The law was actually drafted by us but the Government is to be congratulated on its wise actions”: British American Tobacco and public policy in Kenya: Table 1

Abstract

Background and objective:British American Tobacco (BAT) has historically enjoyed a monopoly position in Kenya. Analysis of recent tobacco control debates and a case study of BAT’s response to the emergence of competition in Kenya are used to explore the company’s ability to shape public policy and its treatment of tobacco farmers.Design:Analysis of internal industry documents from BAT’s Guildford depository, other relevant data and interviews with key informants.Results:BAT enjoys extensive high-level political connections in Kenya, including close relationships with successive Kenyan presidents. Such links seems to have been used to influence public policy. Health legislation has been diluted and delayed, and when a competitor emerged in the market, BAT used its contacts to have the government pass legislation drafted by BAT that compelled farmers to sell tobacco to BAT rather than to its competitor. BAT was already paying farmers less than any other African leaf-growing company, and the legislation entrenched poor pay and a quasi-feudal relationship. BAT’s public relation’s response to the threat of competition and the ministers’ public statements extolling the economic importance of tobacco growing suggest that BAT has manipulated tobacco farming as a political issue.Conclusions:The extent of BAT’s influence over public policy is consistent with the observations that, despite ratifying the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, progress in implementing tobacco control measures in Kenya has been limited. The benefits of tobacco farming seem to be deliberately exaggerated, and an analysis of its true cost benefits is urgently needed. Tobacco farmers must be protected against BAT’s predatory practices and fully informed about its activities to help them have an informed role in policy debates. As image, particularly around the importance of tobacco farming, seems key to BAT’s ability to influence policy, the truth about its treatment of farmers must be publicised.

The Epidemiology of Addiction in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Synthesis of Reports, Reviews, and Original Articles

“…Its production is tightly controlled by multinational companies with links to local politicians. 66 According to the WHO, 3 there were 200,000 tobaccorelated deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa during 2000. The prevalence of tobacco smoking was 29% for males and 7% for females and, among 13-to 15-year-olds, it ranged from 13% in Kenya to 37% in Uganda.…”

The global tobacco control ‘endgame’: Change the policy environment to implement the FCTC

“…5 Tobacco companies are powerful within networks and the capacity of anti-tobacco groups is low. [22][23][24][25] Tobacco companies have the resources to influence legislators 26 and challenge tobacco control in the courts. 27 Tobacco growing and manufacturing is an important source of jobs, exports and revenue and smoking prevalence is rising.…”

Choice of alternative crop enterprises among smallholder tobacco farmers in Teso District, Kenya: A multinomial logit analysis

“…Farmers who depend on tobacco production for their livelihood will therefore need to find other alternative crops to produce. Despite the negative economic, social and environmental impacts associated with tobacco production (Ochola and Kosura, 2007;Patel et al, 2007;WHO, 2008;Geist et al, 2009;Kibwage et al, 2009), evidence suggests that land under tobacco has rapidly grown with new areas like the Rift Valley adopting the crop (Kibwage et al, 2009). This rapid growth is at the expense of food crops whose role is vital to food security and in essence undermines WHO FCTC efforts.…”

“…Most research carried out in tobacco growing regions reveal that switching from tobacco to other enterprises is profitable. Research has shown that there are abundant opportunities to shift from tobacco farming to other crops (Ochola and Kosura, 2007;Patel et al, 2007;Kibwage et al, 2009;Magati et al, 2012).…”