The Language of Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy

Nuzzo, Angelica

doi:10.5840/hsaproceedings2006185

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These include: the process of individuals acquiring and, with others, refining sign systems as a form of socialisation, and semiotic issues of, for example, "stringency" and the "speculative sentence", relevant to the very language appropriate for the articulations of dialectical semiotics itself (Smith 1974;Surber 1975;Nancy 2001;Lau 2006;Nuzzo 2006). For reasons only of space, I have omitted many other equally vital themes of this approach.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prospects of Legal Semiotics

Wagner

Broekman

2011

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prospects of Legal Semiotics

Wagner

Broekman

2011

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…I would like to thank Hagglund, with whom I had inspiring discussions about the arguments in this essay. 10 Nuzzo 1999; see also Nuzzo 2005Nuzzo , 2006Nuzzo and 2007 The exposition of the idea is an exposition of the concept of life and of theoretical and practical cognition as the presuppositions of the freedom of the concept. The absolute idea is thus also a return to life.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hegel's discussion of the speculative proposition in the Preface to the 'Phenomenology of Sprit, especially PS 63/PG 59. On speculative propositions, see Surber 1975, Sallis 1997, Lau 2006and Nuzzo 2006 There is of course much to say about all of the forms of syllogism that Hegel discusses -existence, reflection, and necessity-and about the fact that there is no syllogism of the concept. In the interest of focus, I will only discuss the collapse of the syllogism that the transition from the hypothetical syllogism to the disjunctive syllogism prompts and that leads to a consideration of objectivity.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hegel's Hyperbolic Formalism

Zambrana

2010

Bull. Hegel Soc. G.B.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Science of Logic is perhaps Hegel's most notoriously impenetrable work. Despite well over a century of commentaries as well as the recent proliferation of scholarship, there exists little agreement concerning the text, whether with regard to particular details or the project of speculative logic in general. Nonetheless, the Logic has often been regarded as exemplifying totalizing metaphysics at its worst. Contemporary philosophers concerned with overcoming metaphysics have thus sought to show not only the incoherence of speculative logic but also the perils of Hegel's supposedly totalizing philosophy. In contrast, showing the continuity between Kant and Hegel has been the strategy for establishing a ‘non-metaphysical’ view of Hegel's speculative logic. Against readings of Hegel as a metaphysical monist who defends the reality of the Absolute Idea developing in nature and spirit, speculative logic is presented as the absolute-idealist successor to Kantian transcendental logic. Hegel's speculative logic is an ‘idealist logic’, since it aims at expounding the conditions necessary for the determinacy of any possible object of thought. Speculative logic thus clarities that experience is dependent on non-empirical concepts and, ultimately, on selfconsciousness. Along this interpretative line, Hegel's Science of Logic offers an account of thinking as a norm-based activity, and of concepts as rules for fixing determinacy. The great insight of Hegel's Logic is, on this view, twofold. First, Hegel's notion of the concept [der Begriff] is understood as a holistic-inferential system of logical concepts, since it provides an account of conceptual content as determined by every other possible content. Second, Hegel's analysis of the actualization of the concept — of the concept that has ‘made itself the foundation’, in Hegel's obscure phrasing — provides an account of the fundamental role of authority involved in the process of fixing determinacy. To be bound to a rule is to acknowledge it as having authority over us and at the same time to institute it as authoritative over the states of affairs that we seek to determine. That Hegel spoke of the freedom of the concept is, therefore, crucial. It suggests that determinacy is ultimately a matter of the authorization of reason, of establishing one way of fixing intelligibility over against others.

show abstract

The Language of Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy

Cited by 2 publications

References 2 publications

Prospects of Legal Semiotics

Prospects of Legal Semiotics

Hegel's Hyperbolic Formalism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About