The landscape of international insolvency law

The critical discussion on theories in cross-border insolvency: universalism, territorialism, and modified universalism

“…Moreover, the lack of coordination between insolvency proceedings opened under territorialism may create opportunities for some creditors and debtors to take advantage, such as picking and choosing courts and transferring their assets. [15] This situation often arises in the insolvency of multinational enterprise groups. In this case, the foreign creditor is clearly at a disadvantage to the local creditor.…”

Introduction to Spanish cross‐border insolvency law—an adequate connection with existing international insolvency legislation

“…support can be given voluntarily by other courts and always assuming reciprocity is not made a pre-condition, full and willing co-operation is only to be achieved through the existence of an appropriate international agreement' . 38 The Regulation does not require provisions on reciprocity, since the relationship between Member States is based on mutual trust, but even within the European Union, it has taken over 40 years to achieve consensus on the exact provisions of the Regulation.…”

The effects of reforming regulation in resolving insolvency towards EODB rank improvement: Evidence from Indonesia

“…These include creditors given statutory ranking; possessing a certain guarantee of payment from the assets of the insolvent company; and creditors without guarantee, relying on the surplus after distribution to preferential creditors to meet their claims. 30 In fact, secured creditors are allowed to apply for bankruptcy because even though they already have material guarantees, they often do not have sufficient resources to pay off their debts. In addition, security law in Indonesia remains weak in its execution.…”