1995
DOI: 10.2307/1392370
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The Labor-Market Effects of Introducing National Health Insurance: Evidence from Canada

Abstract: While National Health Insurance (NHI) We examine monthly data on employment, wages, and hours across 8 industries and 10 provinces over the 1961-1975 period. We find that employment actually rose after the introduction of NHI; wages increased as well, while average hours were unchanged.

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Cited by 32 publications
(31 citation statements)
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“…Health insurance may increase employment overall by improving health and reducing the work disincentive from other means-tested public assistance programs, which may also result in increased labor productivity. In line with this prediction, Gruber and Hanratty (1995) find that employment increased in Canada after the introduction of national health insurance. Additionally, studies examining the introduction of the U.S. continuation-of-coverage mandates, such as COBRA (e.g.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 65%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Health insurance may increase employment overall by improving health and reducing the work disincentive from other means-tested public assistance programs, which may also result in increased labor productivity. In line with this prediction, Gruber and Hanratty (1995) find that employment increased in Canada after the introduction of national health insurance. Additionally, studies examining the introduction of the U.S. continuation-of-coverage mandates, such as COBRA (e.g.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 65%
“…Additionally, studies examining the introduction of the U.S. continuation-of-coverage mandates, such as COBRA (e.g. Gruber and Madrian 1995), find resulting increases in job switching. By de-linking health insurance and employment (but not increasing income, since recipients must pay their own health premiums), these mandates may increase productivity not only by improving health but by enabling improved job matches, that is, reducing “job-lock” 1…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An informal yet intuitive test of reverse causality based on that proposed by Gruber and Hanratty (1995) in a similar modelling exercise is to include in each of our three models two lead dummy variables, the first indicating whether a FFS method will be adopted the following year, and the other indicating whether a PBP arrangement will be introduced in the following year. If, in our models, causality goes from the provider payment method in place to the outcome variable, the coefficients on the lead dummies will be zero.…”
Section: Testing For Reverse Causalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An informal yet intuitive test of reverse causality based on that proposed by Gruber and Hanratty (1995) in a similar modeling exercise is to include in each of our three models a lead dummy variable indicating whether SHI will be adopted the following year. If causality goes from SHI to the outcome variable, the coefficient on the lead dummy will be zero.…”
Section: Testing For Reverse Causalitymentioning
confidence: 99%