The justificatory power of moral experience

Abstract

A recurrent issue in the vast amount of literature on reasoning models in ethics is the role and nature of moral intuitions. In this paper, we start from the view that people who work and live in a certain moral practice usually possess specific moral wisdom. If we manage to incorporate their moral intuitions in ethical reasoning, we can arrive at judgements and (modest) theories that grasp a moral experience that generally cannot be found outside the practice. Reflective equilibrium (RE) provides a framework for balancing moral intuitions, ethical principles and general theories. Nevertheless, persisting problems associated with the use of intuitions need to be addressed. One is the objection that moral intuitions lack the credibility necessary to guide moral reasoning. Ethicists have tried to solve this problem by formulating criteria to separate the "bad" intuitions from the "good" ones at the beginning of the reasoning process. We call this the credible input-justified outcome strategy. An example is the appeal to the common morality by Beauchamp and Childress. We think this approach is unsuccessful. As an alternative, we outline the good reasoning-justified outcome strategy. It connects to a variant of RE in which intuitions from different sources are incorporated. We argue that the elements of RE have different levels of justificatory power at the start of reasoning. In our strategy, each element can gain or lose justificatory power when it is tested in a reasoning process that meets several criteria.

Ethics by opinion poll? The functions of attitudes research for normative deliberations in medical ethics: Table 1

“…Furthermore, especially philosophers working in medical ethics see a risk of logical fallacies and doubt whether attitudes research can be at all helpful for normative reflection. The question is raised whether we can trust in our own and other people's prereflective moral stances, or would it be better if they were replaced by reasoning skills 8 9 which allow for a more thorough dealing with intricate ethical challenges. Other authors argue that ethical reflection should not be based on ‘mere’ attitudes, but that moral actors should be expected to give reasons and rationally explain their moral standpoints instead 10…”

Specifying the Method of Reflective Equilibrium: A Methodological Framework

“…To arrive at a justified output, the argument goes, it is important to start from credible inputs (cf. Van Thiel and Van Delden 2009). And indeed, one of the criteria of the RE conception described in Chap.…”

“…Considering Commitments of Others Secondly, on her own, the epistemic agent may only come up with a limited selection of relevant considerations. To broaden the input, the agent should thus also consider the opinions of others, like other researchers, but also of practitioners and of affected parties-for example, in a biomedical context, the commitments of physicians, nurses, and patients (Van Thiel and Van Delden 2009). While the agent does not have to accept the commitments of others at face value, it is important to consider them in order not to overlook aspects of the subject matter that the agent herself might not have access to, or where the agent might be lacking the experience to form commitments.…”

Wisdom and Ethico-Legal Practice

“…Wisdom recognises the value of testing a response with others. Wisdom allows individuals to recognise emotion and intuition in analysis (van Thiel & van Delden, 2009) without necessarily privileging either response. A wise approach to ethico-legal analysis acknowledges that a perfect, definitive answer may be illusory.…”