1991
DOI: 10.1515/9781400843794
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The Juggler

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Cited by 118 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…40 In the Tehran Conference 1943, Roosevelt pressed for this proposal and Stalin in principle supported it, but suggested, as Churchill had separately, that it would require management through respective regional committees, rather than global cooperation. 41 The Soviet view of the matter came from a different outlook. 42 The lesson of the League's demise from the Soviet outlook was a confirmation that imperial powers inevitably descend into war.…”
Section: And the Cold War Ordermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…40 In the Tehran Conference 1943, Roosevelt pressed for this proposal and Stalin in principle supported it, but suggested, as Churchill had separately, that it would require management through respective regional committees, rather than global cooperation. 41 The Soviet view of the matter came from a different outlook. 42 The lesson of the League's demise from the Soviet outlook was a confirmation that imperial powers inevitably descend into war.…”
Section: And the Cold War Ordermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…59 Similarly, Secretary of State Cordell Hull's dismissal of Russia's actions toward Poland as a 'piddling little thing' which could not be allowed to get in the way of the 'main issues' of great-power co-operation demonstrated just how compromising the Allies were willing to be. 60 What the public and private records indicate is that there existed amongst the three greatest powers a determination to maintain co-operation and an understanding that, given the huge material strength of each, the only viable way to do this was through appeal to common interests and compromise. Put another way, pursuit of mutual interests and acceptance of the need for accommodation were recognised as the only means by which cohesion along the horizontal axis of great-power concert could be preserved; within the rank of the great powers there was little, if any, scope for the exercise of material might as a means to persuasion.…”
Section: The Great-power Concert and The Post-war Peacementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The idea of 'peace by dictation' had given way to a far more consultative approach in which the great powers, though still dominant, would be obliged to confer with and persuade lesser powers in order to act in the name and for the sake of the post-war peace. Similarly, the idea of a world in which, in Roosevelt's words, 'the small powers might have rifles, but nothing more dangerous' 119 was rejected in favour of one in which all of the United Nations would possess a level of arms commensurate with their domestic and, more significantly, their international responsibilities. This constituted a fundamental reassessment of the great power-lesser power hierarchy.…”
Section: The Evolving Nature Of Attitudes Toward Post-war Hierarchymentioning
confidence: 99%