The Judicial Role and the Rule of Law

Graver, Hans Petter

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44293-7_1

Cited by 2 publications

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“…"Judicial resistance" is the case of judges setting themselves "against justice" while performing their judicial duties, which usually means undertaking steps in defiance of illegitimate measures introduced by authoritarian, semi-authoritarian, "illiberal", or otherwise oppressive regimes (Osiel 1995, Graver 2015. The literal meaning of "resistance" is an instance of active opposition, especially in the military or political sense, 1 which connotes an organized movement, one that perhaps even involves armed fighting 2 against an occupying power or an illegitimate regime to undermine it wholly or at least partially, often by any necessary and available means.…”

Section: Introduction: Judicial Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, this understanding hardly fits the description of historical cases of "judicial resistance" in literature. The most prominent examples so far cover Nazi Germany, the several Nazioccupied European jurisdictions during World War II, the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, military juntas of Southern America and apartheid South Africa (Osiel 1995, Dyzenhaus 2010, Graver 2015. Judges may also be found to resist manifestly immoral laws in otherwise democratic, even liberal, legal-political systems; for instance, this was the case of some U.S. judges before the American Civil War who used creative strategies in their jurisprudence to subvert slave laws operating through the Fugitive Slave Clause (Cover 1984, Baker 2012, Zajadło 2019).…”

Section: Introduction: Judicial Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many of these strategies are carried out in secret, or at least the judges are not always open about the real motives of their actions. Judicial resistance often amounts to either opposition or dissent and results from an individual decision of a judge rather than a collective action or an organized group movement (Graver 2015). However, the recent studies of the on-bench cases of judicial resistance rightly underline the critical role of social-collegial aspects in the strengthening of judges' resolve (Fleck 2022), including the role of judicial associations and self-help in upholding judicial independence (Coman and Puleo 2022).…”

Section: Introduction: Judicial Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

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Judicial resistance and the virtues

Widłak

2024

Oñati Socio-Legal Series

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This article concerns the concept of judicial resistance understood in connection with the individual, on-bench decisions undertaken by judges in view of upholding the rule of law and in defiance of measures introduced by authoritarian, semi-authoritarian, "illiberal", or otherwise oppressive regimes. The point of focus is the normative dimension of acts of judicial resistance and the contention that they constitute the rightful obligation of judges. The article claims that judicial resistance interpreted as a right or duty is objectionable. As it will be argued, the key reason is the inadequacy of the rule-oriented models (deontic and consequentialist) on which the categories of right and duty rest to address the descriptively and evaluatively thick notion of judicial resistance. Instead, the article will argue for a virtue-centred model which explains judicial resistance through the character strengths of a virtuous judge. After expounding the conception of judicial virtue and the approach of a virtuous judge, the analysis will argue how perceiving the capacity to resist in terms of virtue allows for overcoming difficulties connected with the claim that a judge has a right or duty to resist. In the last part, the analysis will propose a list of three virtues that may be especially adequate for judicial resistance based on selected examples. Este artículo aborda el concepto de resistencia judicial entendido en relación con las decisiones individuales, en el estrado, adoptadas por los jueces con el fin de defender el Estado de Derecho y desafiar las medidas introducidas por regímenes autoritarios, semiautoritarios, "antiliberales" u opresores de otro tipo. El punto central es la dimensión normativa de los actos de resistencia judicial y la afirmación de que constituyen una obligación legítima de los jueces. El artículo afirma que es objetable que la resistencia judicial sea interpretada como un derecho o un deber. Como se argumentará, la razón clave es la inadecuación de los modelos orientados a las normas (deónticos y consecuencialistas) en los que descansan las categorías de derecho y deber para abordar la noción descriptiva y evaluativamente espesa de la resistencia judicial. En su lugar, el artículo defenderá un modelo centrado en la virtud que explique la resistencia judicial a través de los puntos fuertes del carácter de un juez virtuoso. Tras exponer la concepción de la virtud judicial y el enfoque de un juez virtuoso, el análisis argumentará cómo el hecho de percibir la capacidad de resistencia en términos de virtud permite superar las dificultades relacionadas con la afirmación de que un juez tiene el derecho o el deber de resistir. En la última parte, basándose en ejemplos seleccionados, el análisis propondrá una lista de tres virtudes que pueden ser especialmente adecuadas para la resistencia judicial.

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Section: Introduction: Judicial Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introduction: Judicial Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introduction: Judicial Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

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Judicial resistance and the virtues

Widłak

2024

Oñati Socio-Legal Series

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“…111 Research suggests maturity is associated with stability in personal traits; see(Donnellan et al 2007), p. 237-264.112 See(Bieliauskaitė 2013), p. 804-808; for an overview of moral education and virtues, see (Kristjánsson 2013), p. 269-287.113 See(Kotsonis 2019), p. 239-252. 114 For the importance of exemplars, see(Graver 2024);(Amaya 2013), pp. 428-445; cf.…”

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confidence: 99%

Rule of Law and the Criteria for Appointment of Judges: A Case for Judicial Virtues

Widłak

2024

Hague J Rule Law

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This article seeks to develop a case for a virtue-oriented (or aretaic) approach to the criteria for appointing judges. It will argue for the usefulness of judicial virtue by showing its theoretical relevance for describing and explaining the criteria for selecting judicial candidates and claiming its advantage over the currently used syncretic sets of criteria used in European jurisdictions. The analysis will explore the connection between the criteria of judicial selection and the Rule of Law. If the Rule of Law is to be understood at its core as a process of tempering the arbitrariness of power, it requires certain personality traits of character on the part of the judiciary. This article argues that virtue is a context-relevant concept well-entrenched in legal culture that amounts to a personality aspect of the Rule of Law. In support of this point, the article discusses the two possible methods of establishing judicial virtues – using a targeted approach to virtue and an Aristotelian-inspired method of uncovering a catalogue of judicial virtues from the insights into the legal culture. The article concludes with policy-oriented advice on incorporating a virtue-centred approach to judicial selection processes.

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The Judicial Role and the Rule of Law

Cited by 2 publications

References 3 publications

Judicial resistance and the virtues

Judicial resistance and the virtues

Rule of Law and the Criteria for Appointment of Judges: A Case for Judicial Virtues

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