The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy

Oytana, Yves

doi:10.1628/093245614x14017020626304

JITE

2014

DOI: 10.1628/093245614x14017020626304

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The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy

Yves Oytana¹

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Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…In a broader context, the adjudicator may also gather information from other sources. For instance,Oytana (2014) develops a model where the appellate court makes decisions on the basis of information provided by -potentially biased -experts.…”

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confidence: 99%

On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible

Friehe

Gabuthy

2019

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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This paper describes how plaintiff should compensate lawyers, who choose unobservable effort, when litigation may proceed from the trial to the appeals court. We find that, when it is very likely that the defendant will appeal, transfers made to the lawyer only after an appeals court’s ruling are key instruments in incentivizingbothtrial and appeal court effort. Indeed, the lawyer may not receive any transfer after the trial court’s ruling. In contrast, when reaching the appeals stage is unlikely, a favorable trial court ruling triggers a positive transfer to the lawyer and first-best appeals effort. In our setup, the lawyer may receive a lower transfer after winning in both the trial and the appeals court as compared to the scenario in which the first-instance court ruled against the plaintiff and the appeals court reversed that ruling.

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confidence: 99%

On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible

Friehe

Gabuthy

2019

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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Expert opinion in a tort litigation game

Oytana¹,

Chappe²

2018

Eur J Law Econ

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We investigate the potential impact of various proposed reforms intended to improve the quality of expert testimony while reducing its cost, and to facilitate the work of judges in appointing experts and reading their reports. To do so, we present a unilateral care model under strict liability in which the court cannot perfectly observe the amount of harm a tortfeasor has caused to a victim. However, the judge may appoint an expert to improve his chance of reaching a correct decision. In this context, we find that the likelihood of a victim filing a lawsuit decreases with the quality of the expert testimony and with the cost of the expertise procedure, and increases with the non-monetary cost for the judge to appoint an expert. Moreover, we find that the effects of these parameters on the injurer's level of precaution are ambiguous. We also find that the injurer's level of care is suboptimal. Finally, we make some public policy recommendations in order to (i) increase the injurer's level of care and (ii) reduce the expected cost of a trial in the event of an accident. We find that the policy maker faces a trade-off between these two objectives.

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Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?

Chopard¹,

Fain²,

Roussey³

2017

Review of Law &Amp; Economics

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This paper challenges the commonly held belief that the appeals process reduces the occurrence of legal errors. We show that, although the right to file an appeal or request adjudication offers an opportunity to correct mistakes made at trial, the final impact of the appeals process on the accuracy of judicial decisions is not always desirable because of its effects on the trial court decision-maker’s effort and on deterrence. In particular, we find that if (i) the trial court decision-maker is more concerned with legal errors than with her reputation, (ii) few potential offenders attribute high benefits to committing harmful acts and (iii) the additional effort exerted by the decision-maker has a stronger impact on wrongful acquittals than on wrongful convictions, then the implementation of an appeals process may spur a decision-maker to reduce her effort and may thus be detrimental to the quality of judicial output.

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The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible

On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible

Expert opinion in a tort litigation game

Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?

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