2014
DOI: 10.1093/hrlr/ngt042
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The Jewel in the Crown and Its Three Guardians: Independence of National Preventive Mechanisms Under the Optional Protocol to the UN Torture Convention

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Cited by 31 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…There is now a vibrant scholarship examining OPCAT and the work of NPMs. Reflecting the fact that many countries around the world are yet to designate NPMs, or are at the early stages of implementation, much of this scholarship uses legal methodology to interpret OPCAT’s provisions (Murray et al., 2011; Rogan, 2019; Steinerte, 2014; Steinerte and Murray, 2009), especially to assess how OPCAT operates, or will operate, in particular countries (Culo, 2015; Fernandez, 2005; McGregor, 2017; Pierce, 2014). Scholarship has also examined the interactions between different types or layers of prison monitoring, such as the relationship between the SPT and the CPT (de Beco, 2011).…”
Section: The Operation Of Prison Inspection and Monitoring Bodiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is now a vibrant scholarship examining OPCAT and the work of NPMs. Reflecting the fact that many countries around the world are yet to designate NPMs, or are at the early stages of implementation, much of this scholarship uses legal methodology to interpret OPCAT’s provisions (Murray et al., 2011; Rogan, 2019; Steinerte, 2014; Steinerte and Murray, 2009), especially to assess how OPCAT operates, or will operate, in particular countries (Culo, 2015; Fernandez, 2005; McGregor, 2017; Pierce, 2014). Scholarship has also examined the interactions between different types or layers of prison monitoring, such as the relationship between the SPT and the CPT (de Beco, 2011).…”
Section: The Operation Of Prison Inspection and Monitoring Bodiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This gap in our understanding is significant, as it means we are missing opportunities to learn about how correctional oversight is working and how it could work more effectively. There are several honourable exceptions to the general lack of literature on correctional oversight, including legal analyses and assessments of OPCAT (Bicknell et al, 2018; Bicknell and Evans, 2017; Evans and Morgan, 1998; Morgan and Evans, 1999; Murray et al, 2011; Steinerte, 2014), and work examining the types of oversight structures in US states (Deitch, 2010). This scholarship provides an invaluable lens by which to understand oversight structures, but there remains a need to explore the practical operation of correctional oversight bodies.…”
Section: Background and Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Even in circumstances where independence is guaranteed in statute, it may be wholly undermined by inadequate resourcing of the work which the oversight body can do. Such is the importance of independence to the work of NPMs, that Steinerte (2014) has described it as the ‘jewel in the crown’ under OPCAT. Steinerte (2014) points to the importance of financial independence for NPMs, describing it as a ‘crucial factor that has a direct bearing upon the ability of an NPM to function independently and effectively’ (p. 15).…”
Section: Correctional Oversight and The Question Of Resourcesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Despite its name, here we use the term ‘monitoring’ when describing its activities, because the Inspector of Prisons is external to the prison system and is, under law, independent of it. This is not to say that the independence of the Inspector of Prisons should be accepted uncritically; its functional independence is called into question by the fact that the Inspector relies on the Department of Justice for funding, which is not uncommon for prison oversight bodies (Steinerte, 2014). As Steinerte shows, the independence of oversight bodies generally should be interrogated closely in light of the many ways in which prison oversight bodies rely on the agencies they are designed to oversee, for example for human or other resources.…”
Section: Inspection and Monitoring Of Prisons: Defining The Termsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At the same time, we see the interesting perspective emerging that European and United Nations’ monitoring mechanisms are becoming ‘tighter’ forms of control of states (Cliquennois and Snacken, 2018), placing increasingly onerous obligations on states and subjecting them to more scrutiny. There has also been a large amount of work concerning the legal implications of OPCAT, and a great deal of scholarly attention paid to the interpretation and application of OPCAT in domestic legal systems (Steinerte, 2014; Murray et al, 2011).…”
Section: Inspection and Monitoring Bodies In Practice: How Are Rightsmentioning
confidence: 99%