The Iterated Hawk–Dove Game Revisited: The Effect of Ownership Uncertainty on Bourgeois as a Pure Convention

Mesterton‐Gibbons, Mike; Karabiyik, Tugba; Sherratt, Tom N.

doi:10.1007/s13235-014-0111-5

Cited by 7 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…We present our model in Section 2. We demonstrate how it shares several features with other animal interaction models in the literature (Eshel and Sansone, 2001;Eshel, 2005;Mesterton-Gibbons et al, 2014) and that in certain limits it reduces to a form of the IPD that was described in Axelrod (1984). Importantly, our model addresses how differences in resource holding potential (RHP) can affect animals' optimal strategies while also providing a framework for modeling progressive assessment of RHP by enabling animals' behaviors to change as information about RHP is learned through experience (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976;Parker and Rubenstein, 1981;Enquist and Leimar, 1983).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 59%

“…The large variety of different models often makes it difficult for biologists without detailed mathematical knowledge to understand the differences and similarities in the implications of different models. In general, models in which resources are ultimately divided unequally between 'winners' and 'losers' (Eshel and Sansone, 2001;Eshel, 2005;Fawcett and Johnstone, 2010;Hammerstein, 1981;Houston and McNamara, 1991;Kura et al, 2015Kura et al, , 2016Mesterton-Gibbons et al, 2014 are often based on the Hawk-Dove framework described in Maynard Smith (1979), whereas models that con-centrate on the evolution of sharing and other apparently paradoxical acts of cooperation (Baek et al, 2017;Carvalho et al, 2016;Doebeli and Hauert, 2005;Nowak and Sigmund, 1993a,b;Nowak, 2012;Trivers, 2006) are often based on the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) framework described in Axelrod (1984). This distinction poses the question of whether one needs to consider rather different models for outcomes with cooperation versus overt aggression.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dominance, sharing, and assessment in an iterated Hawk–Dove game

Hall

Porter

Dawkins

2020

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Animals use a wide variety of strategies to reduce or avoid aggression in conflicts over resources. These strategies range from sharing resources without outward signs of conflict to the development of dominance hierarchies, in which initial fighting is followed by the submission of subordinates. Although models have been developed to analyze specific strategies for resolving conflicts over resources, little work has focused on trying to understand why particular strategies are more likely to arise in certain situations. In this paper, we use a model based on an iterated Hawk-Dove game to analyze how resource holding potentials (RHPs) and other factors affect whether sharing, dominance relationships, or other behaviors are evolutionarily stable.We find through extensive numerical simulations that sharing is stable only when the cost of fighting is low and the animals in a contest have similar RHPs, whereas dominance relationships are stable in most other situations.We also explore what happens when animals are unable to assess each other's RHP without fighting, and we compare a range of strategies for this problem using simulations. We find that the most successful strategies involve a limited period of assessment followed by a stable relationship in which fights are avoided, and that the duration of assessment depends both on the costliness of fighting and on the difference between the animals' RHPs. Along with our direct work on modeling and simulations, we develop extensive software to facilitate further testing; and we make it publicly available at https: //bitbucket.org/CameronLHall/dominancesharingassessmentmatlab/.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 59%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dominance, sharing, and assessment in an iterated Hawk–Dove game

Hall

Porter

Dawkins

2020

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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“…In this article, we show that complex strategies are marginalized (7) by equalizer strategies, rather than by a general memory-one strategy. Thus, under specific circumstances, the analysis of equalizer strategies suffice to predict the outcomes of a combat.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…Marginalization of the strategies (7) can be supported only by experimental results because it does not change the outcome probabilities (7) and, therefore, does not affect the gain (2) and corresponding evolutionary stability. Further attempts to support or refute prediction of outcome probabilities (26) and self assessment for conflict escalation, require more data of animal contests in the same vein as in S. Austads study on bowl and doily spiders: contest of two speciments with know outcome probabilities and evolutionary payoffs.…”

Section: Figmentioning

confidence: 99%

Single equalizer strategy with no information transfer for conflict escalation

Engel

Feigel

2018

Phys. Rev. E

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In an iterated two-person game, for instance prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game, there exist strategies that force the payoffs of the opponents to be equal. These equalizer strategies form a subset of the more general zero-determinant strategies that unilaterally set the payoff of an opponent. A challenge in the attempts to understand the role of these strategies in the evolution of animal behavior is the lack of iterations in the fights for mating opportunities or territory control. We show that an arbitrary two-parameter strategy may possess a corresponding equalizer strategy which produces the same result: statistics of the fight outcomes in the contests with competitors are the same for each of these two strategies. Therefore, analyzing only the equalizer strategy space may be sufficient to predict animal behavior if nature, indeed, reduces (marginalizes) complex strategies to equalizer strategy space. The work's main finding is that there is a unique equalizer strategy that predicts fight outcomes without symmetric cooperation responses. The lack of symmetric cooperation responses is a common trait in conflict escalation contests that generally require a clear winner. In addition, this unique strategy does not assess information of the opponent's state. The method bypasses the standard analysis of evolutionary stability. The results fit well the observations of combat between male bowl and doily spiders and support an empirical assumption of the war of attrition model that the species use only information regarding their own state during conflict escalation.

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“…For example, in the one‐off version of the Hawk–Dove game with confusion over ownership described in Section 4.2, Mesterton‐Gibbons et al . () showed that mistakes are costly to Bourgeois in a way that they are not costly to anti‐Bourgeois – so much so that anti‐Bourgeois is always more efficient than Bourgeois, regardless of whether Doves are intrusive or unintrusive. Moreover, in the iterated Hawk–Dove game of Section 4.2, X is more efficient than B even when there is no confusion over ownership (Mesterton‐Gibbons, ) because more empty sites are found by members of an anti‐Bourgeois population than by those of a Bourgeois one.…”

Section: Model Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution of respect for property

Sherratt

Mesterton‐Gibbons

2015

J of Evolutionary Biology

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Although possession is 'nine-tenths of the law', respect for ownership is widespread in the animal kingdom even without third-party enforcement. Thus, the first individuals to find objects are frequently left unchallenged by potential competitors and tend to win contests when disputes arise. Game theory has shown that respect for ownership ('Bourgeois' behaviour) can arise as an arbitrary convention to avoid costly disputes. However, the same theory predicts that a paradoxical respect for lack of ownership ('anti-Bourgeois' behaviour) can evolve under the same conditions and in some cases is the only stable outcome. Despite these predictions, anti-Bourgeois behaviour is rare in nature, whereas respect for ownership is frequently not absolute. Here, we review extensions of the classic models involving repeated interactions, confusion over roles, strategic coordination of behaviour ('secret handshakes'), owner-intruder asymmetries and continuous control of fighting investment. Confusion over roles and owner-intruder asymmetries in fighting ability may explain why respect for ownership is often partial. Moreover, although most model extensions facilitate the evolution of Bourgeois-like behaviour, secret handshakes and continuous control of fighting investment render the alternative anti-Bourgeois convention unstable. We develop these insights to highlight several key areas for future investigation.

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The Iterated Hawk–Dove Game Revisited: The Effect of Ownership Uncertainty on Bourgeois as a Pure Convention

Cited by 7 publications

References 34 publications

Dominance, sharing, and assessment in an iterated Hawk–Dove game

Dominance, sharing, and assessment in an iterated Hawk–Dove game

Single equalizer strategy with no information transfer for conflict escalation

The evolution of respect for property

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