The Invasion of Britain in A. D. 43 - An Alternative Strategy for Aulus Plautius

Abstract

HE invasion of Britain, which was carried out by four legions plus auxiliaries under A. Plautius some time in the high summer of AD. 43, and the subsequent sixteen-day expedition made by the emperor, Claudius, in person in the autumn of that year, form together one of the most famous, if not one of the best understood, episodes in the history of the Roman Empire. In spite of the apparent familiarity of the event our knowledge of the way in which the invasion was planned, and of the route followed, is scanty in the extreme. It is based in part on a very brief summary of Claudius' own journey to Britain, which was a separate expedition of reinforcement, undertaken in order to associate Claudius personally with the prestige of the project. This is described by Suetonius in his Divus Claudius, written some eighty years after the event, 1 but the chief source for the whole invasion is the narrative in Greek given by the historian Cassius Dio some century and a half after the expedition. 2 To these can be added short references of a mere sentence in length, also in Suetonius' Caesares. They relate to the presence of the future emperor, Galba, in Claudius' entourage in Gaul, 3 and to the large part played by Vespasian, and his brother and son, in the early stages of the Roman conquest. 4 Another, and earlier, mention of Vespasian's part in the conquest is to be found in Josephus' Bellum Judaicum, but it contributes no useful or circumstantial detail, and indeed nothing but praise of Josephus' patrons, the Flavian dynasty. 5 Later Roman historians, such as Aurelius Victor and the anonymous writer of De Caesaribus, merely give abbreviated versions of the already meagre information retailed by the historians of the second and early third centuries. 6 Eutropius does add some circumstantial detail, namely that Gn. Sentius (Saturninus) was jointly in command of the expedition with A. Plautius, 7 and that the Orkney Islands (Orcades) were received under Roman control by Claudius. This submission, if it is historical, must have been received through envoys at very long distance, while Claudius was in Colchester. This latter item is repeated by the early fifth-century Christian writer, Orosius. 8 * I am grateful to the editorial board of Britannia for a number of most useful comments on this paper in draft. This is not to claim their acceptance of all or any part of the suggestions put forward here. Any errors that remain are my own.

The Roman Channel Crossing of A.D. 43: The constraints on Claudius’s naval strategy

“…It may be seen as drawing some force from the evidence for the campaign undertaken by the Legio 1I Augusta under the command of Vespasian in the south-west in the period immediately following the invasion. Hind (1989) has introduced a new element into the academic debate by proposing that all three divisions of the expeditionary force landed near Chichester, arguing that this makes possible a more satisfactory interpretation of the record of subsequent events in the campaign. Bird more recently (2000) has also argued for this hypothesis, although his interpretation of Plautius's line of advance differs from Hind's to allow for the impracticality of advancing from the Chichester area towards the Thames across the Wealden clay.…”

Boundaries and Change: The Examination of the Late Iron Age-Roman Transition

“…Military involvement in Britain in the post conquest period was proportionate to the circumstances relating to local capitulation (Mattingly 2007: 267). While the cooperation of a client kingdom present in West Sussex required only low scale military involvement, the presence of a harbour at Fishbourne as a possible invasion point (Hind 1989), increased the necessity for a military presence here and the balance between the two possibly explains the quasi-military occupation. As Creighton (2005: 155) suggests, the Roman annexation did not lead to British rejection of the past, as indicated by the siting of towns on pre-existing Territorial Oppida.…”

Claudius, Elephants and Britain: Making Sense of Cassius Dio 60.21.2

“…13.20; 14.2; 15.61. As Hind (2007, 94) points out, it does not seem that he used Tacitus’ Annales ; see also Hind 1989, 2. Black (2001, 426) thinks it most likely that Cluvius Rufus was one of Dio's main sources for the Roman operations in Britain.…”