The interplay between unexpected events and behavior in the development of explicit knowledge in implicit sequence learning

Abstract

Some studies in implicit learning investigate the mechanisms by which implicitly acquired knowledge (e.g., learning a sequence of responses) becomes consciously aware. It has been suggested that unexpected changes in the own behavior can trigger search processes, of which the outcome then becomes aware. A consistent empirical finding is that participants who develop explicit knowledge show a sudden decrease in reaction times, when responding to sequential events. This so called RT-drop might indicate the point of time when explicit knowledge occurs. We investigated whether an RT-drop is a precursor for the development of explicit knowledge or the consequence of explicit knowledge. To answer this question, we manipulated in a serial reaction time task the timing of long and short stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOA). For some participants, the different SOAs were presented in blocks of either long or short SOAs, while for others, the SOAs changed randomly. We expected the participants who were given a blocked presentation to express an RT-drop because of the predictable timing. In contrast, randomly changing SOAs should hamper the expression of an RT-drop. We found that more participants in the blocked-SOA condition than in the random-SOA condition showed an RT-drop. Furthermore, the amount of explicit knowledge did not differ between the two conditions. The findings suggest that the RT-drop does not seem to be a presupposition to develop explicit knowledge. Rather, it seems that the RT-drop indicates a behavioral strategy shift as a consequence of explicit knowledge.

What triggers explicit awareness in implicit sequence learning? Implications from theories of consciousness

“…It has been found that participants who develop explicit knowledge in a SRTT often show a sudden decrease in reaction times in the training phase. This so-called RT-drop indicates that participants change their behavior qualitatively (Haider & Frensch, 2005 ; Haider et al, 2005 ; Haider & Rose, 2007 ; Lustig et al, 2021 ; Rose et al, 2010 ; Wessel et al, 2012 ) and do not mandatorily need to process the stimulus anymore to perform the task. This stimulus-independency of explicit sequence knowledge is further supported by studies that show that participants are no longer affected by incongruent stimulus–response characteristics, such as the Stroop Effect (Haider et al, 2011 ) and the Simon Effect (Koch, 2007 ), or by a frequency-induced response bias (Tubau et al, 2007 ).…”

Using position rather than color at the traffic light – Covariation learning-based deviation from instructions in attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder

“…Some participants notice the covariation, but decide not to use it. Gaschler et al (2019) , see also Gaschler et al (2015) ; Haider and Frensch (2002) , and Lustig et al (2021) have reported further behavioral evidence for that the usage of the covarying stimulus feature takes place based on a top-down decision to change the task strategy. Using four colors and four positions Gaschler et al (2019) could vary the frequency with which particular color-position pairings occurred during practice.…”

Enriched environments enhance the development of explicit memory in an incidental learning task

“…During the presentation of a predictable sequence of stimuli, a discrepancy between the predicted and the actual processing speed can be detected by the participants. Hence, this detection process can trigger attention towards the cause of this discrepancy and due to the consecutive search processes, explicit memory is generated 4 , 11 . This is in line with the Unexpected-Event theory 11 , which postulates that any metacognitive judgment, like unexpected fluency or accuracy, can be an unexpected event and trigger attributive processes.…”

“…Hence, this detection process can trigger attention towards the cause of this discrepancy and due to the consecutive search processes, explicit memory is generated 4 , 11 . This is in line with the Unexpected-Event theory 11 , which postulates that any metacognitive judgment, like unexpected fluency or accuracy, can be an unexpected event and trigger attributive processes. It can be assumed that this fluency of processing is enhanced in computer-screen-related tasks because, in more near-natural settings, the evaluation of stimuli and responses are slowed down by several factors.…”