The International Drug Control Regime

Abstract

Chapter 3 presents more recent tensions around the policy direction that the so-called Vienna consensus entailed. The chapter explores the specific set of interwoven and interrelated themes that have challenged the International Drug Control Regime. It explains the regulatory architecture of the International Drug Control Regime, including the main stakeholders in the system and their interests, as well as the broader trends in the architecture. It argues that there are political differences among the various stakeholders that increasingly fracture the regime: while some states push for some type of reform, others resist change. The chapter concludes that there will be a turning point that is likely to either fragment or reconfigure the system.

Criminal Politics and Botched Development in Contemporary Latin America

“…This regime is reinforced by a powerful intergovernmental bureaucracy (comprising Interpol and UN machinery, including agencies and treaty oversight mechanisms) charged with combating different facets of the drug business, which often opposes reforms to legalize the industry (McAllister 2012). Despite its fragmented nature and problematic approach, 13 the regime plays a large role in shaping the nature and logic of the illicit drug industry (Hallam and Bewley-Taylor 2021).…”

WHO’s first scientific review of medicinal Cannabis: from global struggle to patient implications

“…7–8). Compared with the 1950s’ meetings and subsequent reports hastily drawn up on the back of an envelope , the methodology, quality of work and mechanisms for the review of substances considered for international control have evolved substantially (WHO, 2010), although there is still room for improvement (Danenberg et al , 2013; Hallam et al , 2014).…”

“…On top of that, the treaties’ criteria for substance scheduling, under which the ECDD has to frame its reviews, are anything but scientifically sound: they base the addition of new drugs to the Schedules on their similarity to CCDs (Danenberg et al , 2013; Hallam et al , 2014; Lohman and Barrett, 2020; Riboulet-Zemouli, 2018, pp. 18–19).…”

Incorporating Child Rights into Scheduling Decisions at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs

“…Under the treaties, controlled substances are listed according to their risk profile. Each 'schedule' carries specific international obligations in relation to the substances it contains (see Hallam, Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2014). Substances seen as particularly risky, with little or no therapeutic value, are placed in the schedules carrying the most stringent controls (Article 2, Single Convention; Article 2, 1971, Convention; Article 12, Trafficking Convention).…”

“…While khat has been discussed at the un cnd for decades, concerns about excessive use, in particular among men from diaspora communities in European countries, have increased recently. The International Narcotics Control Board (incb), which oversees the implementation of the drug conventions, has recommended that states place plants containing psychoactive substances under international control (a recommendation aimed at khat), while many states have banned the plant (Hallam, Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2014). In 2006, however, the ecdd reviewed khat and recommended against scheduling the plant itself, stating, 'The level of abuse and threat to public health is not significant enough to warrant international control […] The Committee recognized that social and some health problems result from the excessive use of khat and suggested that national educational campaigns should be adopted to discourage use that may lead to these adverse consequences ' (who, 2006, 11).…”