The interactive turn in social cognition research: A critique

Overgaard, Søren; Michael, John

doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.827109

Cited by 33 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…The second-person approach has a number of interrelated theoretical roots, including the embodiment approach to psychology ( Varela et al, 1991 ; Gallagher, 2001 ; Thompson, 2001 ), phenomenology ( Merleau-Ponty, 1964 ; Husserl, 1970 ), primary and secondary intersubjectivity ( Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978 ; Trevarthen, 1979 , 1980 ), and direct perception (e.g., Gallagher, 2008 ), whereby it is assumed that interactive or second person ( Reddy, 1996 ) contexts provide for an immediate and qualitatively distinct form of social knowing. Various authors have reacted to the second-person approach in recent years (e.g., Michael, 2011 ; Herschbach, 2012 ; Overgaard and Michael, 2015 ; Schönherr, 2016 ), pointing out its limitations for a theory of social understanding. Whereas we follow these latter authors in the belief that the second-person approach cannot fully displace first- and third-person approaches, we also believe that there is a core of fundamental importance in the second-person approach.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Second-Person Information in the Development of Social Understanding

Moore

Barresi

2017

Front. Psychol.

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We consider the second-person or interactive approach to social understanding, conceived as an understanding of intentional relations. We identify five forms of second-person information – self-directedness, contingency, reciprocity, affective engagement, and shared intentions – that occur only in interactions. We assess the extent to which these forms of information are available to observers of interactions as well as to the participants of an interaction and conclude that whereas observers may gain some second-person information, interactive participants have a privileged position. We also ask whether these forms of second-person information can deliver social understanding in terms of the understanding of intentional relations that are descriptive of persons. We argue that whereas none of these forms alone is sufficient for understanding intentional relations, they all play an important role in the developmental processes that enable the construction of social understanding. Therefore, the second-person approach, understood as theorizing how second-person information available in interactions is used in the development of social understanding, is a critically important approach to a full theory of social understanding.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Second-Person Information in the Development of Social Understanding

Moore

Barresi

2017

Front. Psychol.

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“…The first such trend of relating the second-person singular and the first-person plural perspective, can be seen in the so-called 'interactive turn' in social cognition research (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007;De Jaegher et al 2010;Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009;Gallagher 2008a, b;Gallagher and Varga 2013;Schilbach et al 2013;Satne and Roepstorff 2015;see, critically, Herschbach 2012;Michael et al 2014;Overgaard and Michael 2015), and the related, rapidly increasing, but still rather narrow body of work exploring links between social cognition, joint attention and joint agency (Pacherie and Dokic 2006;Hobson and Hobson 2007;Butterfill 2013;Gallotti and Frith 2013;Tomasello 2014;Zahavi 2014Zahavi , 2015aAbramova and Slors 2015;León, forthcoming;see Szanto and Moran, forthcoming;Bianchin 2015). For instance, it has been argued that collaborating agents are better mindreaders, since they can draw on a number of situational cues afforded by the very interaction, which might otherwise be unavailable (Butterfill 2013); or that complex forms of we-intentionality and group agency conceptually require more basic face-to-face interaction and dyadic forms of empathy (Zahavi 2015a, b).…”

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Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein

Szanto

Moran

2015

Hum Stud

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Two issues have been at center stage in recent social philosophy, both in the analytic and the continental tradition: on the one hand, the nature of interpersonal understanding, or empathy; on the other hand, the possibility and nature of collective intentionality, shared emotions, and group agency. Indeed, there are not many who have investigated more thoroughly both these issues, and, even if not quite explicitly, their complex interrelation, than the philosopher Edith Stein . This special issue explores Edith Stein's social philosophy, especially as expounded in her phenomenological writings from the 1910s and 1920s. In particular, it will investigate the systematic links between Stein's pioneering work on empathy (Stein 1917), and her less known but certainly not less original theory of collective intentionality and community (Stein 1922).One of the main aims of this special issue is to re-describe, re-contextualize, and critically assess Stein's intriguing phenomenology of social reality in contemporary terms, and, specifically, in relation to the relevant current trends in the philosophy of (collective) emotions, social ontology, social cognition research, social psychology, and political philosophy.If we look at the contemporary philosophical landscape, the issue of empathy and collectivity are typically dealt with separately from one another. Moreover, in stark contrast to Stein-and many other early phenomenologists such as Husserl, Gurwitsch, Scheler, or Walther, who all worked in such diverse areas within social philosophy as social cognition, social ontology or social epistemology, and with a few notable contemporary exceptions (Butterfill 2013; Tomasello 2014; Zahavi & Thomas Szanto

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“…Cf De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007),. DeJaegher et al (2010), Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009), Gallagher (2008a,Gallagher and Varga (2014),Krueger (2011Krueger ( , 2012,Schilbach et al (2013),Satne and Roepstorff (2015),Chemero (2016), see, critically; Herschbach (2012),,Overgaard and Michael (2015). 5 E.g.,Pacherie and Dokic (2006),Hobson and Hobson (2007), Gallotti and Frith (2013),Tomasello (2014),Abramova and Slors (2015),Bianchin (2015),León (2016),Martens and Schlicht (2018).6 Incidentally, early phenomenologists such asGurwitsch (1931) have already pursued very similar lines of interactionist argument regarding empathy, seeJardine and Szanto (2017), and more below.…”

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confidence: 99%