The Inter-Regional Struggle for Resources and the Fall of Yugoslavia

Palairet, Michael

doi:10.2307/j.ctt6wq21x.14

Cited by 16 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Qualitative evidence from other cases provides insight into how relative wealth can trigger even violent conflict. In the former Federal Yugoslavia, many Slovenes expressed resentment over the region's disproportionate contribution to the Federal Fund used for the support of underdeveloped republics (Bookman, 1992), especially for Serbia, which was held responsible for the declining economy in Yugoslavia since 1975 (Palairet, 2007). Eventually, the imbalance in financial contributions drove Slovenia to withdraw from the Federal Fund 'as a part of its general effort to divorce itself from the nation' (Bookman, 1992: 235).…”

Section: Regional Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Inequality and conflict in federations

Deiwiks

Cederman

Gleditsch

2012

Journal of Peace Research

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Case study evidence suggests that inequality between regions in federations affects the risk of secessionist conflict. However, the conventional quantitative literature on civil war has found little support for a link between economic inequality and civil war. We argue that this seeming discrepancy in part stems from differences in the conceptualization of inequality and its operationalization, which has focused on individual-level wealth differences. In contrast, we investigate regional-level inequality, which is more readily applicable to understanding possible incentives for internal conflict. We adopt a spatial approach, based on new geo-coded data on administrative units in 31 federal states between 1991 and 2005, economic wealth, and ethnic settlements, and demonstrate strong evidence that regional inequality affects the risk of secessionist conflict. The results indicate that in highly unequal federations, both relatively developed and underdeveloped regions are indeed more likely to be involved in secessionist conflict than regions close to the country average. In addition, we provide evidence that exclusion from central state power as well as ethnic groups’ access to regional institutions are associated with an increased risk for secessionist conflict. The findings on inequality remain robust even when controlling for other confounding factors such as country GDP, population and war history.

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Section: Regional Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Inequality and conflict in federations

Deiwiks

Cederman

Gleditsch

2012

Journal of Peace Research

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“…In the crisis of the 1970s, faced with exclusion from EEC markets, enterprises borrowed heavily in dollars, via the domestic banking system, from the international banks to finance capital goods imports. Between 1973 and 1979 investment spending rose from 32.2% to 37% of total social output (Palairet, 2007). The finance-led investment boom was derailed by the international oil and interest rate shocks of 1978-9.…”

Section: The Illiquidity Of the Socialist Firm And Dollarizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The finance-led investment boom was derailed by the international oil and interest rate shocks of 1978-9. As loans had been contracted at floating rates, interest rates leaped from 5.8% in 1979 to a crippling 15.1% in 1980 on a debt of $18.5bn (Palairet, 2007). Yugoslavia was thus seized by debt crisis.…”

Section: The Illiquidity Of the Socialist Firm And Dollarizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financialisation in the Post-Yugoslav Region: Monetary Policy, Credit Money and Dollarization.

Zivkovic

2017

REM

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This paper considers long term processes of financialisation in the former and post-Yugoslavia in relation to the global emergence of financialisation. Regional monetary policy has since the 1980s defended the value of credit money in order to facilitate international capital flows. It is argued that the monetary system of fixed exchange rates, inflation targeting and capital account liberalisation has engineered the subordinate financialisation and dollarization of the region. The present debt crisis is seen as crisis of financialised capitalism and a crisis of European integration before formal European integration, mirroring that of the Eurozone periphery

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“…zagovarali jači politički centar (i smanjenje nadležnosti autonomnih pokrajina), u čemu su videli jemstvo za srpski narod, dok su drugi, a glavni igrači su bili slovenački političari, zagovarali sve drugo: od decentralizacije do tržišne raspodele deviza. Jedan činilac koji se nije mogao raspodeliti bila je stvarna emisija dinara, pa se Jugoslavija mogla od 1974. posmatrati kao novčana unija (Palairet, 2007), u kojoj novac nije "štampala" vlada, već narodna banka "sistemom" dozvoljenih negativnih bilansa republika.…”

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“…Period šezdesetih godina, kada se odvijao ovaj proces raspada elite, počeo je privrednom krizom koja je bila izraz neravnoteža u razvoju. Privredni razvoj se nastavio celim tokom 60ih i do pred kraja 70-ih godina (uništen krajnjim investicionim voluntarizmom republika, već oslobođenih od federacije, 80-ih godina, kad federacije nije bilo, Palairet, 2007), ali se pozitivni efekti tog razvoja nisu mogli osetiti zbog nastavljenih neravnoteža, nedostatka deviza i sukoba oko njihove raspodele. Tada je uvedena i "ekonomska stabilizacija" (nikad dostignuta).…”

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Break-up of the Yugoslav political elite, 1962-1972

Flere

Rutar

2021

Sociologija

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The break-up of the Yugoslav communist elite, which came about in the period 1962-1972, is considered. The break-up came about under the elite?s disappointment due to the failure to achieve economic objectives it set for itself, bringing about internal dubiety and mutual suspicion, the political system moving towards consociation also contributed to fracturing. However, this is not sufficient as explanation. Cultural elites also contributed in the same direction. Economic growth was significant, considering the entire period 1945-1991, but it was always clouded by imbalances. Certain issues and discussions were indicative of the break-up. Political unity and communism was gradually replaced as objective by ?resolving the national question?, also a legitimate Marxist concern. It can be considered that by the break-up, a normalization of elite pattern came about, comparable to elites in the greatest number of European states, although the elites kept on being ?ideocratic?. Whereas elites may have become ?normal?, the functioning of the political system became ever more difficult. The ascending national communist elites never undertook steps at the direct dissolution of the Yugoslav state, although they entered into ceaseless disputes and finally paved the way to ethnic entrepreneurs and counter-elites to implement the dissolution. By the elite break-up a relation between elite and nation similar to the one existing in the great majority of European countries was achieved.

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The Inter-Regional Struggle for Resources and the Fall of Yugoslavia

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

Inequality and conflict in federations

Inequality and conflict in federations

Financialisation in the Post-Yugoslav Region: Monetary Policy, Credit Money and Dollarization.

Break-up of the Yugoslav political elite, 1962-1972

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