Abstract:Over the past several decades, companies have spent literally trillions of dollars acquiring the latest technologies and building their internal information processing and analysis capabilities. And yet with all this expenditure of time, money, and effort, large enterprises are still caught off-guard on an almost daily basis because they fail to anticipate critical developments in their competitive environment. This shortcoming can be mitigated by adopting an intelligence mind-set. This article provides an ove… Show more
“…Maguire et al (2009) and Ojiako et al (2010Ojiako et al ( , 2012 contend that competency to exploit novel situations has often eluded organisations. Furthermore, studies dealing with how businesses can learn from the military (Darling et al, 2005;Ojiako et al, 2010;Roche and Blaine, 2015) suggest that organisations, especially those competing in dynamic environments against irregular social threats from competitors, regulators, advocacy organisations, criminals, cyber-hackers and the like, can learn much from military approaches to combating irregular military threat.…”
Section: Meaning One: Risk Intelligence Is Managing Risk Intelligentlymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…'collecting' information, which is key to competitive, marketing, business and other forms of intelligence practice within organisations (Taplin, 1989), has deep roots in decades of military intelligence theory and practice (Roche and Blaine, 2015 (Aven, 2012(Aven, , 2017. The parallel practice within the military is to evaluate collected intelligence by ensuring its reliability and credibility through a process of filtering and weighting (Corkill, 2008;Wheaton, 2009).…”
Section: Adopting the Terminology Of Military Intelligence Processes:mentioning
This theoretical perspective paper interprets (un) known-(un) known risk quadrants as formed from abstract and concrete risk knowledge. It presents these quadrants as useful, both for categorising risk forecasting challenges against levels of abstract and concrete risk knowledge typically available, and for psychometric research measuring perceived levels of abstract and concrete risk knowledge available for forecasting. Drawing on some cybersecurity risk examples, a case is made for refocusing risk management forecasting effort towards raising unknown-unknowns into known-knowns. We propose achieving this by developing the 'boosted risk radar' as organisational practice where suitably 'risk intelligent' managers gather 'risk intelligence information', such that the 'risk intelligent organisation' can purposefully co-develop both abstract and concrete risk forecasting knowledge. We illustrate what this can entail in simple practice terms within organisations.
“…Maguire et al (2009) and Ojiako et al (2010Ojiako et al ( , 2012 contend that competency to exploit novel situations has often eluded organisations. Furthermore, studies dealing with how businesses can learn from the military (Darling et al, 2005;Ojiako et al, 2010;Roche and Blaine, 2015) suggest that organisations, especially those competing in dynamic environments against irregular social threats from competitors, regulators, advocacy organisations, criminals, cyber-hackers and the like, can learn much from military approaches to combating irregular military threat.…”
Section: Meaning One: Risk Intelligence Is Managing Risk Intelligentlymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…'collecting' information, which is key to competitive, marketing, business and other forms of intelligence practice within organisations (Taplin, 1989), has deep roots in decades of military intelligence theory and practice (Roche and Blaine, 2015 (Aven, 2012(Aven, , 2017. The parallel practice within the military is to evaluate collected intelligence by ensuring its reliability and credibility through a process of filtering and weighting (Corkill, 2008;Wheaton, 2009).…”
Section: Adopting the Terminology Of Military Intelligence Processes:mentioning
This theoretical perspective paper interprets (un) known-(un) known risk quadrants as formed from abstract and concrete risk knowledge. It presents these quadrants as useful, both for categorising risk forecasting challenges against levels of abstract and concrete risk knowledge typically available, and for psychometric research measuring perceived levels of abstract and concrete risk knowledge available for forecasting. Drawing on some cybersecurity risk examples, a case is made for refocusing risk management forecasting effort towards raising unknown-unknowns into known-knowns. We propose achieving this by developing the 'boosted risk radar' as organisational practice where suitably 'risk intelligent' managers gather 'risk intelligence information', such that the 'risk intelligent organisation' can purposefully co-develop both abstract and concrete risk forecasting knowledge. We illustrate what this can entail in simple practice terms within organisations.
“…Future research can overcome previous limitations, through the availability and usability of data and new data methods. It may be able to scrutinize the impact of terrorism over a longer period of time with more than one empirical measurement and transform data into the relevant theory expansion including through text analysis, social media and sentiment analyses, and data analytics (Chen et al, ; Roche & Blaine, ). Ways to strengthen the proposed theoretical approach are hence manifold.…”
Global terrorism incidents and business-related threats have intensified in scale and scope over the past 17 years. Multinational corporations are thus exposed to direct and indirect negative impacts on their international activities. Previous research lacks thorough theoretical frameworks to analyze these impacts. The global value chain (GVC) framework offers a perspective that is both comprehensive and quantifiable for the evaluation and expansion of this prior research. The GVC enables us to assess terrorism impacts on international business overall and at each stage of the value chain. On this basis, we develop a "terrorism resilience theory") that can be used in future theoretical and managerial analyses of the response to terrorism risk.
K E Y W O R D Sglobal terrorism, global value chain, multinational corporations (MNCs), risk, terrorism resilience theory, terrorism risk, uncertainty
“…This is further supported by Xia, Ma, Lu, and Yiu (), who found that while EMNEs’ dependence on foreign firms may increase outward FDI, the level of state ownership mitigates this effect. Other recent work also suggests that EMNEs can learn from governments in areas such as intelligence gathering where governments have greater experience (Roche & Blaine, ). Thus, we propose: Proposition 2a: Coopetition between home country governments and EMNEs increases an EMNE's exploitable resources abroad, decreasing dependence on global rivals .…”
Section: Coopetition With Governments and Global Rivalsmentioning
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