The Institutional Feasibility of National-Local Policy Collaboration: Insights from Brazil and Argentina

Fenwick, Tracy Beck

doi:10.1177/1866802x1000200206

Cited by 22 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…The relationship between the central government and municipalities is key for those interested in understanding the way the federation has been evolving. Fenwick (2010) concluded that municipalities can facilitate the central government's ability to carry out its desired policy goals, particularly in social areas. Within some institutional configurations, the centre may seek uniformity of outcome by trying to circumvent governors and/or regional intermediation and thus forge a direct relationship with municipalities.…”

Section: Reinterpreting the Brazilian Federation: An Analysis Of Two mentioning

confidence: 99%

Coercion in Disguise? A Reassessment of Brazilian Education and Health Reforms

Vazquez

2021

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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In federations and other regionalised arrangements, the search for co-operation may lead to a hierarchical alignment where the centre concentrates policy decision-making power. The use of conditional grants to build this kind of co-ordination can disguise its rather coercive character when opt-out clauses are counteracted by fiscal constraints that virtually force subnational adherence. Previous accounts on recentralisation in Latin America have overlooked this feature, particularly by mistakenly identifying the transfer of fiscal resources and responsibilities with authority over policies. The article adopts a configurational approach, focused on mechanisms, to reassess two Brazilian programmes redesigned in the 1990s and 2000s – the Fundamental Education Fund (Fundef) and the Basic Health Care Programme ( Programa de Atenção Básica, PAB). Our evidence shows that both reforms followed hierarchical paths and received massive adherence of municipalities. We discuss how this kind of coercion in disguise is especially concerning in settings where some retrenchment of social expenditure is expected.

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Section: Reinterpreting the Brazilian Federation: An Analysis Of Two mentioning

confidence: 99%

Coercion in Disguise? A Reassessment of Brazilian Education and Health Reforms

Vazquez

2021

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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“…Although governors are often responsible for resolving people's needs with specific policies or employing people in the provincial state apparatus, mayors are responsible for street-level bureaucrats who ensure that federal and provincial policies reach their intended beneficiaries (Garay, 2007, Fenwick, 2010. Many policies (local, provincial, or federal) are delivered to citizens at the municipal level; thus, municipal collaboration can help the federal government pursue its policy goals (Fenwick, 2009).…”

Section: Explaining Distribution To Subnational Districts: the Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries

Moscovich

Brusco

2018

Rev. Bras. Ciênc. Polít.

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“…; Machado, de Lima, and de Andrade 2014; Montero ). This created problems in the 1990s when fiscal crises and national regulation over subnational expenditures led subnational governments to become more dependent on federal transfers and willing to accept more federal regulations in exchange for funding (Falleti ; Fenwick ). Second, the Constitution did not make any progress regarding the issue of prescription drugs, and especially generic prescription drugs.…”

Section: The Brazilian Path To Health Care Universalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Partisanship: Federalism, the Role of Bureaucrats, and the Path to Universal Health Care Coverage in Brazil

Segatto¹,

Béland²

2018

Politics & Policy

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Scholars have argued that partisanship is the main driving force behind universal social policy, including universal health coverage. This article contributes to this debate by analyzing the Brazilian path to universal health coverage in light of this international social policy literature. The empirical research it features is grounded in the systematization of the literature and the analysis of documents and in‐depth interviews. The analysis shows that the historical and institutional path of federalism, as it intersects with the role of bureaucrats, largely account for the universalization of health care coverage in Brazil. This analysis contributes to the study of social policy universalization by stressing both the limits of partisanship as an explanatory factor and the need to take into account the institutional dynamics of federalism as it interacts with the involvement of bureaucrats in the politics of universality. Related Articles Related Media Saude Amanha. . “Maps and Video Discussion” (in Portuguese). https://saudeamanha.fiocruz.br World Health Organization. . “Tracking Universal Health Coverage: 2017 Global Monitoring Report.” http://www.who.int/healthinfo/universal_health_coverage/report/2017/en/

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The Institutional Feasibility of National-Local Policy Collaboration: Insights from Brazil and Argentina

Abstract: is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

Cited by 22 publications

References 33 publications

Coercion in Disguise? A Reassessment of Brazilian Education and Health Reforms

Coercion in Disguise? A Reassessment of Brazilian Education and Health Reforms

Political alignments and distributive politics at the municipal level in federal countries

The Limits of Partisanship: Federalism, the Role of Bureaucrats, and the Path to Universal Health Care Coverage in Brazil

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