The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders

Abstract

The history of international political orders is written in terms of continuity and change in domestic and international political relations. As a step toward understanding such continuity and change, we explore some ideas drawn from an institutional perspective. An institutional perspective is characterized in terms of two grand issues that divide students of international relations and other organized systems. The first issue concerns the basic logic of action by which human behavior is shaped. On the one side are those who see action as driven by a logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences. On the other side are those who see action as driven by a logic of appropriateness and a sense of identity. The second issue concerns the efficiency of history. On the one side are those who see history as efficient in the sense that it follows a course leading to a unique equilibrium dictated by exogenously determined interests, identities, and resources. On the other side are those who see history as inefficient in the sense that it follows a meandering, path-dependent course distinguished by multiple equilibria and endogenous transformations of interests, identities, and resources. We argue that the tendency of students of international political order to emphasize efficient histories and consequential bases for action leads them to underestimate the significance of rule- and identity-based action and inefficient histories. We illustrate such an institutional perspective by considering some features of the coevolution of politics and institutions, particularly the ways in which engagement in political activities affects the definition and elaboration of political identities and the development of competence in politics and the capabilities of political institutions.

Transgovernmental networks and rationalist outputs? The partial social construction of EU foreign policy

“…By consequentialist practices it is meant ways of doing things that incorporate self-interested and instrumental calculations (cf. March and Olsen 1998). In the context of EU diplomacy, diplomats (still) act by roughly evaluating the alternatives and anticipating the consequences of their actions in the pursuit of national orientations.…”

Assessing EU council presidencies: (Conditions for) success and influence

“…By contrast, the three other categories within the literature have accommodated an increasing amount of theoretically informed research, mostly linked to the debate between rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches (see, for example, March and Olsen, 1998;Niemann and Mak, 2010). Rationalist approaches view (EU Member) States as rational actors trying to maximize their influence in negotiations; the Presidency is an additional power resource.…”

Networked Default: Public Debt, Trade Embeddedness, and Partisan Survival in Democracies Since 1870

“…On logics of consequences and logics of appropriateness, see March and Olsen (1998 polities. There is a third alternative, that defaults in other countries have no effect on the risk of incumbent termination above and beyond their impact on the domestic economy.…”