The insanity defense: Legal standards and clinical assessment

Ogloff, James R. P.; Roberts, Caton F.; Roesch, Ronald

doi:10.1016/s0962-1849(05)80122-2

Cited by 24 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Although the practical effects of changes in legislative boundaries of the offence have historically been much less dramatic than may have been expected (Ogloff, Roberts, & Roesch, 1993), it is difficult to see how such a radical liberalization of the criteria could not have a significant impact on the population coming under the umbrella of insanity provisions.…”

Section: Policy Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Drug‐associated psychoses and criminal responsibility

Carroll

McSherry

Wood

et al. 2008

Behavioral Sci & The Law

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At present, the law draws a distinction when assigning criminal responsibility to those who commit offences while experiencing psychotic symptoms: if the symptoms are believed to arise because of ingesting drugs (an external cause), the offender is generally convicted of the offence; if the symptoms arise from a mental illness (an internal cause), the offender may be afforded a defence of insanity. In practice, drawing such a distinction can be problematic. There are difficulties for example in determining criminal responsibility when the use of drugs is followed by the emergence of a psychotic illness process that then continues to have an independent existence even in the absence of the ongoing substance use. This article analyses legal, policy, and expert witness perspectives relating to liberal, conservative, and intermediate approaches to this problematic area of jurisprudence.

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Section: Policy Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Drug‐associated psychoses and criminal responsibility

Carroll

McSherry

Wood

et al. 2008

Behavioral Sci & The Law

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“…Criticizing the M'Naghten test as too narrow, an "irresistible impulse" rule was formed, which broadened the standard to include severe volitional impairment in individuals who were otherwise aware of the wrongfulness of their actions (Parsons v. State, 1886). However, this test also met resistance, as it required total cognitive or volitional incapacity, in an era where such absolutist views were considered increasingly outdated and irrelevant (Ogloff, Roberts, & Roesch, 1993). More importantly, distinguishing between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted proved to be exceedingly diffi cult (Rogers & Shuman, 2000).…”

Section: A Brief History Of the Insanity Defense And Volitional Impaimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The term "substantial capacity" seemed to allow something less than total cognitive or volitional impairment. Although once widely popular in a majority of U.S. jurisdictions, this standard fell into public disfavor after John Hinckley, who attempted to assassinate President Reagan, was found not guilty by reason of insanity under it (Ogloff et al, 1993). The Hinckley acquittal fueled a growing controversy regarding the volitional prong of the ALI.…”

Section: A Brief History Of the Insanity Defense And Volitional Impaimentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating sex offenders under sexually violent predator laws: How might mental health professionals conceptualize the notion of volitional impairment?

Mercado

Schopp

Bornstein

2005

Aggression and Violent Behavior

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This paper examines the signifi cance of the Supreme Court's Hendricks and Crane decisions, with focus given to how mental health professionals may conceptualize the notion of volitional impairment. The Hendricks decision authorized postsentence civil commitment for sex offenders having a mental abnormality or personality disorder, rendering them likely to engage in future acts of sexual violence. In the Supreme Court's majority opinion, Justice Thomas implied that the Kansas Act was legitimized by limiting the class of offenders eligible for this specialized form of commitment to those who are "unable to control" their dangerousness. In Crane, the Court ruled that while the Hendricks decision does not require that a sex offender be completely unable to control behavior, it does require proof of serious diffi culty in controlling conduct. In evaluating the meaning of this decision for mental health professionals, this paper notes the decline of volitional impairment standards in the insanity defense, summarizes case law regarding sexual predators and volitional impairment, and further reviews the empirical and theoretical literatures exploring the notion of volitional impairment.

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“…The idea that one is not responsible for one's actions when the actions are the product of mental illness, such that they cannot appreciate the nature of their actions, has in one form or another been in existence for centuries (Ogloff, Roberts, & Roesch, 1993). Under law, except for strict liability offences, to be found guilty of a criminal act one must not only have voluntarily committed the act (actus reus), but also have had the capacity to understand the criminality of the act, or form the intent to commit a criminal act (mens rea).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Today there are a number of ways in which clinicians can assess the mental impairment and mental state of the accused, even retrospectively. Primarily, this is done through observation, interview with the accused and collateral sources, file reviews (Dietz, 1985;Ogloff et al, 1993;Simon & Shuman, 2002) and, in the domain of psychologists for the most part, the use of structured assessment instruments. Importantly, clinicians must be mindful of the motivation of accused persons to malinger their symptoms for the purpose of being found not criminally responsible (Ogloff et al, 1993).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%