“…Several explanations have been offered in literature to explain the phenomenon of underpricing. 5 Some of the arguments offered for underpricing are information asymmetry (creating ex-ante uncertainty), which suggests that there is imperfect information among firms, investors, and underwriters (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1989;Rock, 1986); signaling theory, which proposes that firms signal to prospective investors about the quality of their firm (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989;Welch, 1992); marketing theory, which suggests that underpricing brings attention to the stock on the opening day (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2001); regulatory constraints, which are especially prevalent in emerging markets wherein the government imposes regulations that affect the pricing of the firm (Affleck-Graves & Miller, 1989;Brandi, 1987;Krishnamurti & Kumar, 2002;Masulis, 1987); certification of insider information (Booth & Smith, 1986;Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998); underwriter reputation (Beatty & Ritter, 1986); broadening the ownership base post IPO where underpricing helps attract new owners, thus increasing the liquidity of the newly issued firm (Booth & Chua, 1996;Brennan & Franks, 1997); the lack of governance by the board (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001); and spinning that enriches the executives of prospective investment bank clients (Aggarwal, 2003;Fishe, 2002;Krigman, Shaw, & Womack, 1999), among others. Brau and Fawcett (2006) also added a unique perspective to the IPO literature by focusing their Performance of IPOs in Postapartheid South Africa 3 analysis of IPOs using data obtained from a survey of chief financial officers (CFOs).…”