The informational basis of scoring rules

Núñez, Matías; Valletta, Giacomo

doi:10.1007/s10058-015-0176-7

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Interestingly, while there is a by now rich body of literature contrasting Approval Voting with other social choice methods that aggregate dichotomous ballot information, most notably the Plurality Rule 3 , it is fair to say that most voting theorists would avoid taking a stand on whether Approval Voting is superior to the Borda Count or to Alternative Vote 4 . We do not believe that such state of affairs is purely fortuitous: Approval Voting is naturally comparable with rules that aggregate information of parsimonious nature, 1 A comprehensive survey of axiomatic characterizations of approval voting (up to 2010) is to be found in Xu (2010); more recent contributions include Núñez and Valletta (2015), Maniquet and Mongin (2015) and Sato (2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Characterization of Approval Voting Without the Approval Balloting Assumption

Ceron

Gonzalez²

2019

SSRN Journal

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We provide an axiomatic characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption. The dichotomous structure of the informational basis of Approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of normative conditions on the voting procedure. The first one is the wellknown social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, ballot richness, requires voters to be able to express a sufficiently rich set of opinions; the last one, dubbed no single-voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the outcome of the election. Such result is promising insofar it suggests that the informational basis of voting may have a normative relevance that deserves formal treatment. AbstractWe provide an axiomatic characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption. The dichotomous structure of the informational basis of Approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of normative conditions on the voting procedure. The first one is the well-known social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, ballot richness, requires voters to be able to express a sufficiently rich set of opinions; the last one, dubbed no single-voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the outcome of the election. Such result is promising insofar it suggests that the informational basis of voting may have a normative relevance that deserves formal treatment. for very useful comments that greatly improved this paper. All remaining errors are our own. † federica.ceron@univ-paris1.fr ‡ stephane.gonzalez@univ-st-etienne.fr § Financial support of IDEXLYON from Université de Lyon (project INDEPTH) within the Programme Investissements d'Avenir (ANR-16-IDEX-0005) is gratefully acknowledged.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Characterization of Approval Voting Without the Approval Balloting Assumption

Ceron

Gonzalez²

2019

SSRN Journal

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“…11 A comprehensive survey of axiomatic characterizations of approval voting (up to 2010) is to be found in Xu (2010); more recent contributions include Núñez and Valletta (2015), Maniquet and Mongin (2015), Sato (2019), and Brandl and Peters (2019). …”

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confidence: 99%

Approval voting without ballot restrictions

Ceron

Gonzalez

2021

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We axiomatically study voting rules without making any assumption on the ballots that voters are allowed to cast. In this setting, we characterize the family of “endorsement rules,” which includes approval voting and the plurality rule, via the imposition of three normative conditions. The first condition is the well known social‐theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, unbiasedness, roughly requires social outcomes not to be biased toward particular candidates or voters; the last one, dubbed no single voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the social outcome. Building on this result, we provide the first axiomatic characterization of approval voting without the approval balloting assumption. The informational basis of approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of conditions that can be defined on most of the ballot spaces studied in the literature.

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“…These properties are formally defined in the next section.3Martinez and Moreno (2017) do not uniquely characterize negative voting, but identify it as part of a class of voting rules they refer to as qualified outcomes which satisfy support monotonicity and limited symmetry. See alsoNúñez and Valletta (2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization

Heckelman

2021

Rev Econ Design

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An Arrowian Social Welfare Function (SWF) represents a weak ordering of the alternative set derived entirely from individual preference orders. Negative voting considers only a voter's least preferred alternative. We introduce the majority loser opposition property which requires that any alternative ranked last by a majority of voters must be ranked last in the social ordering. We show a SWF satisfies anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, continuity, and majority loser opposition if and only if it is equivalent to negative voting.

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The informational basis of scoring rules

Cited by 4 publications

References 19 publications

A Characterization of Approval Voting Without the Approval Balloting Assumption

A Characterization of Approval Voting Without the Approval Balloting Assumption

Approval voting without ballot restrictions

Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization

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