The influence of schematic knowledge on contradictory versus additive misinformation: false memory for typical and atypical items

Nemeth, Robert J.; Belli, Robert F.

doi:10.1002/acp.1207

Cited by 18 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(28 reference statements)

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“…Thus, support for the trace strength hypothesis in these studies is equivocal, where the results of Experiments 1 and 2 may support it, but Experiment 3 does not. 2 Nevertheless, larger misinformation effects for contextinconsistent items have been observed elsewhere (Luna & Migueles, 2008;Nemeth & Belli, 2006), and these effects have implications for memory outside the laboratory. Eyewitnesses must often report details about unexpected, inconsistent, or atypical events, and our results indicate that memory for such events is not immune to memory distortion through misleading suggestions.…”

Section: Context Consistency and Misinformationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adult Age‐Related Differences in the Misinformation Effect for Context‐Consistent and Context‐Inconsistent Objects

Prull

Yockelson

2013

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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The present study examined age-related differences in the misinformation effect for objects that were consistent or inconsistent with their environmental settings. Young and older adults viewed one of two slide sequences, each containing context-consistent items (e.g., a blender in a kitchen setting or a saw in a woodshop setting) and context-inconsistent items (a saw in a kitchen setting or a blender in a woodshop setting). After receiving misinformation through post-event narratives, participants received tests of yes/no recognition requiring remember/know judgments (Experiments 1-3) and source monitoring (Experiments 2 and 3) for slide details. Although age-related differences in the misinformation effect were nonreliable, older adults tended to report misinformation as remembered more often than young adults, and source monitoring tests reduced the misinformation effect for both age groups. Misinformation effects were equivalent or larger for inconsistent objects than for consistent objects. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.People of all ages experience memory distortions from time to time. At minimum, the inability to remember events accurately is inconsequential, but inaccurate remembering can have serious implications in legal settings in which erroneous eyewitness accounts influence a jury's deliberations and subsequent verdict. In the present study, we ask whether adult age-related differences occur in the misinformation effect, a form of memory distortion for details of witnessed events that occurs after exposure to misleading post-event information (e.g., Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). The effect is typically obtained using a three-stage procedure in which participants first view a series of photographs or watch a video depicting a real-life event such as an accident or crime. Next, participants receive misleading verbal information, often embedded in a questionnaire or a narrative, in which inaccurate details of the witnessed event are introduced. Finally, participants are asked to recall or recognize details from the photographs or video. The misinformation effect is revealed by a higher rate of memory inaccuracy for event details that are followed by misinformation compared with event details that are not followed by misinformation (for reviews, see Ayers & Reder, 1998;Loftus, 2005;Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2006).A small but growing literature on aging and the misinformation effect suggests that healthy older adults are frequently more suggestible than young adults. Out of 17 published reports of which we are aware that compare young and older adults using the three-stage procedure, 11 have reported larger misinformation effects for older adults relative to the young when tested under identical experimental procedures (

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Section: Context Consistency and Misinformationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adult Age‐Related Differences in the Misinformation Effect for Context‐Consistent and Context‐Inconsistent Objects

Prull

Yockelson

2013

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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“…Second, false recall or recognition tends to be greater for schema-consistent items, or is otherwise in the direction of rendering material more schema-consistent than was actually the case (e.g., Graesser et al, 1980;Kleider, Pezdek, et al, 2008;Lampinen et al, 2000;Neuschatz et al, 2002;Roediger et al, 2001; Sherman & Bessenhof, 1999;Smith & Studebaker, 1996; but see Nemeth & Belli, 2006). This effect, we should note, is mirrored in a separate but related line of research, which looks at the role of script knowledge in leading to false memories.…”

Section: Shapes Memory For Fictional Life Storiesmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…However, findings are more mixed with regard to recall (e.g., Graesser et al, 1980;List, 1986;Nemeth & Belli, 2006;Pezdek et al, 1989). This mnemonic advantage of schema-inconsistent items appears to reflect the von Restorff effect, that is, that distinctiveness aids memory (Hunt, 2006;von Restorff, 1933).…”

Section: Shapes Memory For Fictional Life Storiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, in addition to further studies on room schemata (Lampinen, Copeland, & Neushatz, 2001;Nemeth & Belli, 2006;Pezdek et al, 1989), researchers have probed for the mnemonic influence of schemata for eyewitness-related material, such as crime scenes (Holst & Pezdek, 1992;List, 1986;Smith & Studebaker, 1996;Tuckey & Brewer, 2003);…”

Section: Shapes Memory For Fictional Life Storiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The cultural life script as cognitive schema: How the life script shapes memory for fictional life stories

Koppel

Berntsen

2013

Memory

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We tested, across three studies, the effect of the cultural life script on memory and its phenomenological properties. We focused, in particular, on the mnemonic effects of both schema-consistency and frequency in the life script. In addition to testing recognition (in Study 1) and recall (in Studies 2 and 3), we also collected remember/know judgments for remembered events (in Studies 1 and 2) and memory for their emotional valence (in Study 2). Our primary finding was that, across all three studies, higher-frequency events were more memorable than lower-frequency events, as measured through either recognition or recall. We also attained three additional, complementary effects: First, schema-inconsistent events received remember ratings more often than schema-consistent events (in Study 2, with a trend to this effect in Study 1); second, where an event's emotional valence was inconsistent with the life script, memory for its valence was reconstructed to fit the script (in Study 2); and, third, intrusions in recall were disproportionately for life script events (in Study 3), though that was not the case in recognition (in Study 1). We conclude that the life script serves as a cognitive schema in how it shapes memory and its phenomenological properties. Memory, 22, December , available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080December /09658211.2013 4 This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis inThe Cultural Life Script as Cognitive Schema: How the Life Script Shapes Memory for Fictional Life StoriesThe cognitive schema (i.e., a mental structure that organizes one's knowledge and assumptions about the world) represents one of the oldest and most influential concepts in cognitive psychology (see Neisser, 1976, for an overview of early work on schemata). Schemata have been found to structure cognition across a range of contexts, including, and most importantly for the present purpose, to play a role in structuring memory. Bartlett (1932) was the first investigator to bring widespread attention to the effect of schemata on recall, with his investigations demonstrating that, in recounting a Native American folk tale, English participants reconstructed the story to better fit the Western schema of a typical narrative structure (see Bergman & Roediger, 1999, for a more recent replication of Bartlett's findings). Much of the early experimental work on the cognitive underpinnings of memory likewise examined the role of schemata (see for example, Anderson & Pichert, 1978;Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Sulin & Dooling, 1974).In the present investigation, we followed in the vein of a more recent experimental tradition on the influence of schemata on memory. December , available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080December /09658211.2013 5 which had not actually been in the room. Brewer and Treyens interpret their findings for correct recognition and recall as indicating that schemata facilitate retrieval of items which are consistent with a given schema. However, in a su...

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“…Numerous studies have shown that misleading suggestions introduced after an event can distort the memory for that event, in what is known as the misinformation effect (for reviews, see Pansky, Koriat, & Goldsmith, 2005;Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2007). In a prototypical misinformation experiment participants who are exposed to an event are later presented with MPI that is either contradictory to event details (e.g., Loftus et al, 1978;, provides additive information that was not part of the original event (e.g., Fiedler, Walther, Armbruster, Fay, & Naumann, 1996;Lindsay & Johnson, 1989), or both (e.g., Frost, 2000;Nemeth & Belli, 2006). Suggestibility is said to occur if the introduction of MPI increases the reporting of the suggested items on a subsequent memory test compared to a control condition in which MPI was not introduced.…”

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confidence: 99%

Interactions between spontaneous instantiations to the basic level and post-event suggestions

Pansky

Tenenboim

2011

Memory

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Extensive research shows that post-event suggestions can distort the memory for a target event. In this study we examined the effect of such suggestions as they interact with the products of a spontaneous memory process: instantiation of abstract information to an intermediate level of abstractness, the basic level (Pansky & Koriat, 2004 ). Participants read a narrative containing items presented at the superordinate level (e.g., FRUIT), were exposed to suggestions that referred to these items at the basic level (e.g., APPLE), and were finally asked to recall the original items. We found that the tendency to instantiate spontaneously in the control (non-misleading) condition, particularly over time, increased following exposure to suggestions that were likely to coincide with those instantiations. Exposure to such suggestions, either immediately or following a 24-hour delay, reduced subsequent correct recall of the original items only if the suggested information coincided with the information one tends to instantiate spontaneously in a given context. Suggestibility, in this case, was particularly pronounced and phenomenologically compelling in terms of remember/know judgements. The findings are taken to imply that effects of post-event suggestions can be understood in terms of the constructive processes that set the stage for their occurrence.

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The influence of schematic knowledge on contradictory versus additive misinformation: false memory for typical and atypical items

Cited by 18 publications

References 17 publications

Adult Age‐Related Differences in the Misinformation Effect for Context‐Consistent and Context‐Inconsistent Objects

Adult Age‐Related Differences in the Misinformation Effect for Context‐Consistent and Context‐Inconsistent Objects

The cultural life script as cognitive schema: How the life script shapes memory for fictional life stories

Interactions between spontaneous instantiations to the basic level and post-event suggestions

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