The influence of schemas, stimulus ambiguity, and interview schedule on eyewitness memory over time.

Abstract

The authors examined how a crime schema influenced the types of details witnesses recalled over multiple interviews that varied in delay before the initial interview and between subsequent interviews. Accuracy data showed that, in general, schema-irrelevant traces experienced greater decay than schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent traces after the initial interview and that delaying the initial interview negatively affected recall at the initial interview but led to less decay over subsequent interviews. Ambiguity of the crime stimulus was also manipulated. Witnesses used their schema to interpret ambiguous information and, as a result, made more schema-consistent intrusions and less correct responses and were more likely to report false memories that involved conscious recollection (using the remember-know paradigm).

The cultural life script as cognitive schema: How the life script shapes memory for fictional life stories

“…They have typically found that schema-inconsistent items are remembered better than schema-consistent items, at least in recognition memory (Graesser et al, 1979;Lampinen et al, 2001;Neuschatz et al, 2002;Shapiro & Fox, 2002). Similarly, researchers have also found that, when asked to make remember-know judgements, participants assign more remember judgements to schema-inconsistent items than to schema-consistent items (Lampinen al., 2000;Lampinen et al, 2001;Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). Therefore, our finding that the latter effect extends to schema-inconsistent versus schema-consistent life script events establishes that the effect of schemata on the phenomenological properties of recollection holds for the life script as well.…”

“…Thus, in addition to further studies on room schemata (Lampinen, Copeland, & Neushatz, 2001;Nemeth & Belli, 2006;Pezdek et al, 1989), researchers have probed for the mnemonic influence of schemata for eyewitness-related material, such as crime scenes (Holst & Pezdek, 1992;List, 1986;Smith & Studebaker, 1996;Tuckey & Brewer, 2003);…”

“…Based on prior research, and our own suppositions as to how the life script would serve to structure memory and its phenomenological properties, we began with the following four hypotheses: (1) In light of the von Restorff effects that have been found with schemainconsistent material in prior schema research, particularly when memory has been tested through recognition (e.g., Graesser et al, 1979;Lampinen et al, 2001;Neuschatz et al, 2002;Shapiro & Fox, 2002), we hypothesized that correct recognition would be greater for schemainconsistent than schema-consistent events; (2) following from Berntsen and Rubin's (2004) contention that life script events are rendered more memorable than non-life-script events, we hypothesized that, given that high-frequency events are considered to be a life script event by more people than are low-frequency events, correct recognition would correspondingly be greater for high-frequency events; (3) based on the distinctiveness effects on remember/know judgements in prior schema research, in which schema-inconsistent items have received more remember judgements (e.g., Lampinen et al, 2000;Lampinen et al, 2001;Tuckey & Brewer, 2003), we hypothesized that the same would hold true here; and (4) based on the prior findings of greater false recognition and recall for schema-consistent than inconsistent material (e.g., Neushatz et al, 2002;Roediger et al, 2001), we likewise hypothesized that false recognition would be greater for life script events than for non-life-script events. That is, given that life script events are attached to the life script, while non-life-script events are not attached to the script, non-life-script events should not be the object of schematic false alarms to the same extent as life script events.…”

“…The first is that, in addition to recall and/or recognition, some investigators have also looked at whether schemaconsistency likewise bears on remember/know judgements for recognized or recalled items (Tulving, 1985). They typically find that, just as schema-inconsistent items are remembered better than schema-consistent items, so too are they more frequently assigned remember judgements (Lampinen al., 2000;Lampinen et al, 2001;Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). This also appears to be due to the greater distinctiveness of schema-inconsistent items.…”

Brief Report: Schema Consistent Misinformation Effects in Eyewitnesses with Autism Spectrum Disorder

“…Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2005;Luna & Migueles, 2008;Roediger, Meade & Bergman, 2001) and false memory effects (e.g. GarciaBajos & Migueles, 2003;Holst & Pezdek, 1992;Tuckey & Brewer, 2003a, 2003b have been demonstrated in eyewitness paradigms with typical individuals. However no research to date has examined this with witnesses with high-functioning autism, despite their well-documented difficulties in event memory and memory organisation.…”