The Influence of Romanian Campaign Finance Laws on Party System Development and Corruption

Abstract

A B S T R A C TWhile East European party systems have received considerable attention, little research has been conducted on the influence of campaign finance laws on party system development. It is surprising that this issue receives such little attention given the widespread use of these laws in East Europe and that the requirements and especially the enforcement mechanisms of these laws have an influence on corruption. This article examines the logic behind public campaign financing and its implementation in Romania. The first section of the article explores the rationale behind party campaign finance, notes some of the criticisms of state campaign subsidies and addresses how party campaign finance generally influences the party system. The second section examines the Romanian campaign finance system and addresses how party campaign finance has influenced the development of parties, the party system and corruption.KEY WORDS Ⅲ corruption and Romania Ⅲ party campaign finance Ⅲ party development Ⅲ party subsidiesThe issue of party development in East Europe has received considerable attention over the past decade. Much of the literature attempts to explain party development by reference either to the transition process (Ishiyama, 1995;Olson, 1998) or to the influence of institutional factors such as the electoral system (Herron and Nishikawa, 1999;Moser, 1999). However, the relationship between campaign finance laws and party system development has received far less attention. Most of the recent research that has been conducted on the relationship between campaign finance and party development tends to explore these linkages in Western countries (Katz and Mair, PA R T Y P O L I T I C S V O L 8 . N o . 2 pp. 175-192

Party regulation and party politics in post-communist Europe

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Breaking the Cycle? How (Not) to Use Political Finance Regulations to Counter Public Procurement Corruption

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