The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto

Sauermann, Jan; Beckmann, Paul

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.07.008

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 24 publications

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“…Overall, this study contributes to a growing literature on the influence of otherregarding preferences in collective decisions (e.g. Eavey 1991;Eavey and Miller 1984b;Sauermann 2018;Sauermann and Beckmann 2019;Sauermann and Kaiser 2010). In other areas, such as collective action theory, empirical findings on the influence of social preferences have led to the development of new behavioral theories and thus greatly increased our understanding of social interactions (see Ostrom 1998Ostrom , 2010.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 69%

On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the ‘chaos theorems’ in a laboratory experiment

Sauermann

2020

Theory Decis

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In light of the so-called 'chaos theorems' from social choice theory, William Riker (W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1982) argues that the indeterminacy of majority rule leads to voting cycles making democratic decisions arbitrary and meaningless. Moreover, when the core is empty, majority instability correlates with the level of conflict among actors. This study uses laboratory committee decisionmaking experiments to provide an empirical test of both aspects of Riker's argument. Committees make repeated majority decisions over 20 periods picking points from a two-dimensional policy space. The experiment manipulates committee members' preferences and thus varies the existence of a core and the level of conflict between group members. The experimental results contradict Riker's interpretation of the chaos theorems' implications. Thus, the core exhibits less attraction than generally assumed. Moreover, an empty core is not associated with increased majority rule instability. Instead, conflicting preferences lead to more instability irrespective of the existence of an equilibrium.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 69%

On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the ‘chaos theorems’ in a laboratory experiment

Sauermann

2020

Theory Decis

Self Cite

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Social Norms and Prosociality under Voting by Veto

Beckmann

Sauermann

2022

Jahrbuch Für Handlungs- Und Entscheidungstheorie

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The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto

Sauermann

2020

Soc Choice Welf

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The tyranny of the majority is one of the most frequently discussed problems of democracy in political theory. It arises when winning majorities are fixed and permanent, and there are no checks on the majority’s ability to dominate the minority. In this paper, I investigate the effects of communication on the occurrence of majority domination. Theoretically, communication cuts both ways. On the one hand, forming and maintaining a coalition requires coordination between individuals, which is barely accomplishable without opportunities to communicate. On the other hand, communication strengthens prosocial orientations in groups and should thus prevent the permanent exclusion of minorities. I argue that publicity of communication is crucial. The prosocial effects of communication dominate when communication is public whereas exclusive majorities form under private communication. I test my claim in a series of laboratory experiments where five-member committees make distributional decisions using the voting mechanism ‘voting by veto’. Compared to a baseline treatment without communication, groups distribute benefits more equally when they have the opportunity to communicate in a public chat. When communication is private, however, majoritarian coalitions form that exclude a minority of group members from the distribution of benefits.

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The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto

Cited by 6 publications

References 24 publications

On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the ‘chaos theorems’ in a laboratory experiment

On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the ‘chaos theorems’ in a laboratory experiment

Social Norms and Prosociality under Voting by Veto

The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto

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