The Influence of Collective Bargaining on Teachers' Salaries in New York State

Lipsky, David B.; Drotning, John E.

doi:10.1177/001979397302700102

Cited by 20 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…The studies surveyed use data from years ranging from 1967 to 2008. The studies utilizing data from 1967 to 1969 are Lipsky and Drotning () and Kasper (). We include these studies and all other estimates coming from 1970s data in the 1970s category .…”

Section: Subgroup Analysis: Explaining the Variation In Union Wage Esmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Part of the literature we survey attempts to identify the type of teachers that are served by the unions by examining the differing impacts on new and senior teachers earnings (Han ; Lipsky and Drotning ; West and Mykerezi ; Winters ; Zwerling and Thomason ). The consensus is that teachers unions increase the earnings of senior teachers, but not new hires.…”

Section: Collection Of Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We allow weights to vary within a study because this is not a reasonable assumption for our set of studies. See Han (), Lipsky and Drotning (), or Tracy () for examples where sample sizes vary substantially within a study.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Wage Impact of Teachers Unions: A Meta‐analysis

Merkle

Phillips

2017

Contemporary Economic Policy

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Publicly, the impact of teachers unions on education is a hotly debated topic. Opponents posit that teachers unions constrain the ability of public officials to implement policy change, raise the cost of providing quality education, and divert funds from students. Since the 1970s, stimulated both by the 1966 Coleman Report and the increase in teacher unionization, social scientists have been interested in the role of teachers unions in the production of education. There has been substantial research on the role of teachers unions, both in economics 1 and education literature. This research explores the multitude of effects teachers unions may have including wage impacts, changes to overall expenditures, changes in the quality of teachers in a district, changes to the components of collective bargaining agreements (CBA), effects on student achievement, and class size effects.In this paper, we conduct a meta-analysis of the oldest and largest subgroup of teachers union research, the differential wage impacts of

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Section: Subgroup Analysis: Explaining the Variation In Union Wage Esmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Collection Of Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Wage Impact of Teachers Unions: A Meta‐analysis

Merkle

Phillips

2017

Contemporary Economic Policy

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“…In all but three of the studies that preceded L-T-86, the market power variable was the number of districts in the assumed labor market area, usually a county. One of the three exceptions (Lipsky and Drotning, 1973) used an even cruder measure: a dummy variable for upstate New York (less populous = less competitive). Prior to L-T-86, only Landon and Baird (1971) --as a sidebar to their main results --and Johnson and Mack (1978) had used a variable that reflected relative district size.…”

Section: Key Issues and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monopsony power in the market for teachers: Why teachers should support market-based education reform

Merrifield¹

1999

J Labor Res

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Employers can exploit individuals with high moving costs when local labor markets are not competitive. Along with nurses and university faculty, teachers are sometimes in such a disadvantageous situation. Teachers 'price elasticity of supply may be quite low in many regions, and their geographic mobility may be low when they are their household's second wage earner Their occupational mobility is often low because of the scarcity of alternate employers within commuting distance. Nearly 96 percent of Texas' teachers work in tax-financed school districts, and many regions have only one district. An econometric model developed from school district data from 48 South Texas and 48 North Texas counties supports the hypothesis that teachers are paid less in less competitive labor markets. In Texas, teachers'salaries are not determined by collective bargaining between district ~fficials and teacher unions. That relatively unique feature of Texas makes it especially well-suited to the task ~f disentangling monopsony effects from other labor market forces.

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“…For, to quote them quoting Summers (1976): 'The public employer is financed by the taxpayer and is supposed to be subject to the control of and answerable to the citizenry.' For example, see Landon and Baird (1971), Schmenner (1973), and Lipsky and Drotning (1973). I believe this a r g u m e n t is incorrect.…”

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confidence: 99%

Comments on E. G. West and R. J. Staaf

Ehrenberg

1981

Public Choice

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s provocative paper argues that agency shop provisions in state public sector collective bargaining legislation, provisions that have recently been found to be constitutional by the Supreme Court in the Abood case (Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 97 S.Ct. 1782 (1977), may increase the costs of public education. Their underlying analytical framework is that of a state which confers monopoly power on a public sector union and a union whose sole concern is to win monopoly wage gains for its members. West and Staaf claim that the costs of these wage gains may far exceed the benefits of the legislation, the resulting reduction in negotiation costs, that are perceived by legislatures and the judiciary. In sum, they conclude that agency shop provisions in public education are undesirable because the provisions aid and encourage unions and the latter have primarily negative effects on the educational process.I must confess to being unsympathetic to their conclusions and less than totally satisfied with their paper, for it presents little empirical support for the propositions they set forth. Allow me to offer four examples here.First, one might get the impression from their paper that agency shop provisions in the public sector are fairly prevalent in the U.S. and are uniform across states. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. As of January 1978, only 16 states explicitly provided for any form of union security clause, other than voluntary dues check-off, in their public sector collective bargaining legislation and not all of these contained agency shop provisions. Moreover, 31 states explicitly prohibited union security clauses for public school teachers (see Hanslowe et al., 1978).The variation in legislative provisions across states provides one with the means to test one of their fundamental propositions, namely that union power is abetted by union security clauses. Presumably this could be done by modifying the models used in previous studies of public sector wage determination to allow the effect of unions to vary with the form of union security clause present in the state and then estimating the modified models (for example, see Ehrenberg and Goldstein, 1975). Of course in doing so, an Public Choice 36: 641-645 (1981) 0048-5829/81/0363-0641 $00.75.

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The Influence of Collective Bargaining on Teachers' Salaries in New York State

Cited by 20 publications

References 0 publications

The Wage Impact of Teachers Unions: A Meta‐analysis

The Wage Impact of Teachers Unions: A Meta‐analysis

Monopsony power in the market for teachers: Why teachers should support market-based education reform

Comments on E. G. West and R. J. Staaf

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