2011
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109011000123
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The Influence of Affect on Beliefs, Preferences, and Financial Decisions

Abstract: Neuroeconomics research shows that brain areas that generate emotional states also process information about risk, rewards, and punishments, suggesting that emotions influence financial decisions in a predictable and parsimonious way. We find that positive emotional states such as excitement induce people to take risks and to be confident in their ability to evaluate investment options, while negative emotions such as anxiety have the opposite effects. Beliefs are updated so as to maintain a positive emotional… Show more

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Cited by 348 publications
(201 citation statements)
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“…In general, as seen in Figure 4, across Active/Passive and Gain/Loss trials, subjects update their priors in such a way that the expressed posterior probabilities that the stock is paying from the good distribution is significantly higher (by 12% on average) than the objective Bayesian posterior for low values of this objective probability, and significantly lower (by 13% on average) than the objective Bayesian posterior for high values of this objective probability, a result which replicates the experimental patterns documented in Kuhnen and Knutson (2011). This relationship between subjective and objective posterior beliefs resembles the relationship between decision weights and objective probabilities postulated by Prospect Theory (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Prelec (1998)), but it refers to errors in updating priors, and not to people's tendency to overweight rare events and underweight frequent ones.…”
Section: Probability Estimation Errors Across Domainssupporting
confidence: 67%
“…In general, as seen in Figure 4, across Active/Passive and Gain/Loss trials, subjects update their priors in such a way that the expressed posterior probabilities that the stock is paying from the good distribution is significantly higher (by 12% on average) than the objective Bayesian posterior for low values of this objective probability, and significantly lower (by 13% on average) than the objective Bayesian posterior for high values of this objective probability, a result which replicates the experimental patterns documented in Kuhnen and Knutson (2011). This relationship between subjective and objective posterior beliefs resembles the relationship between decision weights and objective probabilities postulated by Prospect Theory (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Prelec (1998)), but it refers to errors in updating priors, and not to people's tendency to overweight rare events and underweight frequent ones.…”
Section: Probability Estimation Errors Across Domainssupporting
confidence: 67%
“…We conjecture that the qualitative expectations are affective evaluations of the market situation, while the numerical estimates draw on more cognitive resources (cp. Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011). We would then expect these evaluations to be predictive for decisions that are made in the same "mode" of thinking.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, subjects may get conditioned to associate a particular type of stimulus with a particular outcome. Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) also conduct a within-subjects analysis of risk-taking using images as stimuli. Their experiment, unlike ours, features a complex estimation task in which the subjects must infer an unknown payoff probability distribution from the outcomes they observe.…”
Section: Prior Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%