The Inferior Performance of State Owned Enterprises: Is it Due to Ownership or Market Structure?

Goldeng, Eskil; Grünfeld, Leo A.; Benito, Gabriel R. G.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.741787

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Those studies which concentrated on the European situation found a negative relationship (Kocenda & Svejnar [51]; Grünfeld, Benito, & Goldeng [52]) even though the authors underlined that their results should be taken cautiously because private ownership does not always perform better. Outside Europe many studies are concentrated on emerging countries with an increasing emphasis on China.…”

Section: Ownership Structure and Company Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Performance: Evidence from Italian Companies

Fratini¹,

Tettamanzi²

2015

OJBM

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The purpose of this paper is to verify the presence and intensity (extent) of the relationship between corporate governance and performance in Italian listed companies by using both accounting and non-accounting performance measures. We extended previous literature in considering all the main aspects of governance (board structure and ownership structure) and all relevant peculiarities of Italian entrepreneurial system (family business, concentrated ownership, State ownership, pyramidal groups). In the first part of the paper, we used regression analysis on a sample of 182 Italian listed companies to find that firm performance was positively related to board size and audit committee's effort and negatively related to leverage, although with a very low coefficient. No particular relationship was highlighted for ownership structure. We tested the consistency of this finding by doing a follow-up analysis between a sub-group of 134 of 2003 sample companies and the same companies in 2007 to verify the stability of the determinants of performance and their relative impact overtime. What we found was that only board size kept its positive relation with performance. Audit committee and leverage lost their relevance in 2007 sample in which the presence of a compensation committee showed a positive impact on performance. From our findings, we can conclude that, according to other studies (Belcredi & Rigamonti [1]), the relationship among ownership and corporate governance structure and firm performance is ambiguous. The ambiguity improves if considering the relationship overtime.

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Section: Ownership Structure and Company Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Performance: Evidence from Italian Companies

Fratini¹,

Tettamanzi²

2015

OJBM

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“…Thus, the state ownership has no significant impact on the strategic performance of largest companies in developed European countries measured with Tobin's Q coefficient. These results lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 1 that is in conflict with the results obtained in [Grunfeld et al, 2005] and [Farinos et al, 2006]. In those papers the authors managed to prove the negative influence of state ownership over corporate performance in developed markets.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…In those papers the authors managed to prove the negative influence of state ownership over corporate performance in developed markets. We suppose this difference may be explained by the sample difference, since [Grunfeld et al, 2005] and [Farinos et al, 2006] used the one-country sample (Norway and Spain correspondingly) while we use the international sample. As a result, in this research we spend less attention to the country specialties; we are concentrated on the results on aggregate level of developed / emerging countries.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of State Ownership and Investor Protection Level on Corporate Performance: Cross-Country Analysis

Stepanova

Yakovlev²

2011

КФ

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В данной статье авторы моделируют влияние государственной собственности на корпоративную эффективность в рамках концепции финансовой архитектуры, а также проводят межстрановой анализ этой зависимости в целях выявления геополитических особенностей. Межстрановой анализ сфокусирован на уровне развития институциональных механизмов, созданных для защиты прав миноритарных инвесторов. Ключевые результаты работы согласуются с выводами ряда исследований, проведенных на данных развитых и развивающихся рынков. Вклад работы в развитие корпоративных финансов заключается в совместном анализе двух важных факторов (государственной собственности и уровня защиты прав инвесторов в стране) и их влияния на корпоративную эффективность с учетом взаимовлияния этих факторов.

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